In metaphysics, particulars or individuals are usually contrasted with universals. Universals concern features that can be exemplified by various different particulars. Particulars are often seen as concrete, spatiotemporal entities as opposed to abstract entities, such as properties or numbers. There are, however, theories of abstract particulars or tropes. For example, Socrates is a particular (there's only one Socrates-the-teacher-of-Plato and one cannot make copies of him, e.g., by cloning him, without introducing new, distinct particulars). Redness, by contrast, is not a particular, because it is abstract and multiply instantiated (for example a bicycle, an apple, and a particular woman's hair can all be red). In the nominalist view, everything is particular. A universal at each moment in time, from the point of view of an observer, is a set of particulars.
Overview
Sybil Wolfram writes:
Particulars include only individuals of a certain kind: as a first approximation individuals with a definite place in space and time, such as persons and material objects or events, or which must be identified through such individuals, like smiles or thoughts.
Some terms are used by philosophers with a rough-and-ready idea of their meaning. This can occur if there is lack of agreement about the best definition of the term. In formulating a solution to the problem of universals, the term 'particular' can be used to describe the particular instance of redness of a certain apple as opposed to the 'universal' 'redness' (being abstract).
The term particular is also used as a modern equivalent of the Aristotelian notion of individual substance. Used in this sense, particular can mean any concrete (individual) entity, irrespective of whether it is spatial and temporal or not.
See also
- Epistemological particularism
- Moral particularism
- Type–token distinction
- Particular affirmative/negative
References
- Honderich, Ted (2005). "particulars and non-particulars". The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
- Craig, Edward (1996). "Particulars". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
- Sybil Wolfram, Philosophical Logic, Routledge, London and New York, 1989, ISBN 0-415-02317-3, page 55.
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In metaphysics particulars or individuals are usually contrasted with universals Universals concern features that can be exemplified by various different particulars Particulars are often seen as concrete spatiotemporal entities as opposed to abstract entities such as properties or numbers There are however theories of abstract particulars or tropes For example Socrates is a particular there s only one Socrates the teacher of Plato and one cannot make copies of him e g by cloning him without introducing new distinct particulars Redness by contrast is not a particular because it is abstract and multiply instantiated for example a bicycle an apple and a particular woman s hair can all be red In the nominalist view everything is particular A universal at each moment in time from the point of view of an observer is a set of particulars OverviewSybil Wolfram writes Particulars include only individuals of a certain kind as a first approximation individuals with a definite place in space and time such as persons and material objects or events or which must be identified through such individuals like smiles or thoughts Some terms are used by philosophers with a rough and ready idea of their meaning This can occur if there is lack of agreement about the best definition of the term In formulating a solution to the problem of universals the term particular can be used to describe the particular instance of redness of a certain apple as opposed to the universal redness being abstract The term particular is also used as a modern equivalent of the Aristotelian notion of individual substance Used in this sense particular can mean any concrete individual entity irrespective of whether it is spatial and temporal or not See alsoEpistemological particularism Moral particularism Type token distinction Particular affirmative negativeReferencesHonderich Ted 2005 particulars and non particulars The Oxford Companion to Philosophy Oxford University Press Craig Edward 1996 Particulars Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Routledge Sybil Wolfram Philosophical Logic Routledge London and New York 1989 ISBN 0 415 02317 3 page 55 This article about metaphysics is a stub You can help Wikipedia by expanding it vte
