Infallibilism is the epistemological view that propositional knowledge is incompatible with the possibility of being wrong.
Definition
In philosophy, infallibilism (sometimes called "epistemic infallibilism") is the view that knowing the truth of a proposition is incompatible with there being any possibility that the proposition could be false. This is typically understood as indicating that for a belief to count as knowledge, one's evidence or justification must provide one with such strong grounds that the belief must be true, or equivalently, that it is completely impossible for it to be false. The infallibility of such a belief may also mean that it cannot even be doubted.
Infallibilism should not be confused with the universally accepted view that a proposition P must be true in order for someone to know that P. Instead, the infallibilist holds that a person who knows P could not have all of the same evidence (or justification) that one currently has if P were false, and therefore that one's evidence/justification offers a guarantee of the truth of P. Thus, in cases where a person could have held the same true belief P with the same level of evidence (or justification) and still been wrong, the infallibilist holds that the person does not know P.
The infallibilist defines knowledge in the following way: A person (henceforth S) knows that a proposition (henceforth P) is true if and only if:
- P is true.
- S believes that P is true.
- S is justified in their belief that P is true.
- S's justification guarantees the truth of P.
According to the infallibilist, fallible beliefs may be rationally justified, but they do not rise to the level of knowledge unless their truth is absolutely certain given one's evidence. The contrary view to infallibilism, known as fallibilism, is the position that a justified true belief may be considered knowledge even if one's evidence does not guarantee its truth, or even if one can rationally doubt it given one's current evidence.
Infallibilism should not be confused with skepticism, which is the view that knowledge is unattainable for rational human beings. While numerous critics of infallibilism claim that defining knowledge according to such high standards collapses into epistemic skepticism, many proponents of infallibilism (although not all) deny that this is the case.
History
René Descartes, an early proponent of infallibilism, argued, "my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false".
Contemporary infallibilism
Infallibilism is rejected by most contemporary epistemologists, who generally accept that one can have knowledge based on fallible justification. Baron Reed has provided an account of the reasons why infallibilism is so widely regarded as untenable today.
Broad consensus notwithstanding, some contemporary philosophers have presented arguments in defense of infallibilism and have therefore come to reject fallibilism. For instance, Mark Kaplan defends such a view in a 2006 paper entitled "If You Know You Can't Be Wrong". Other notable contemporary proponents of infallibilism include Andrew Moon, Julien Dutant, and Matthew Benton.
See also
- Infallibility
References
- Lacewing, Michael (2013). "Infallibilism and the Cartesian circle" (PDF). A Level Philosophy. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 4, 2016. Retrieved Oct 11, 2015.
- Rysiew, Patrick (7 September 2007). "Epistemic Contextualism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 June 2020.
- Reed, Baron (2 February 2008). "Certainty". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 20 June 2020.
- Descartes, Rene (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-07707-1.
- Reed, Baron (7 June 2001). "How to Think about Fallibilism" (PDF). University of Washington Course Server. Retrieved Oct 11, 2015.
- Kaplan, Mark (2006). "If You Know You Can't be Wrong". In Hetherington, Stephen (ed.). Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 180–198.
- See Moon, Andrew (2012). "Warrant does entail truth". Synthese. 184 (3): 287–297. doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9815-2. S2CID 9851726.; Dutant, Julien (2016). "How to Be an Infallibilist" (PDF). Philosophical Issues. 26: 148–171. doi:10.1111/phis.12085.; and Benton, Matthew (2021). "Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism". Synthese. 198: 1673–1689. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1794-8. S2CID 46955518..
Infallibilism is the epistemological view that propositional knowledge is incompatible with the possibility of being wrong DefinitionIn philosophy infallibilism sometimes called epistemic infallibilism is the view that knowing the truth of a proposition is incompatible with there being any possibility that the proposition could be false This is typically understood as indicating that for a belief to count as knowledge one s evidence or justification must provide one with such strong grounds that the belief must be true or equivalently that it is completely impossible for it to be false The infallibility of such a belief may also mean that it cannot even be doubted Infallibilism should not be confused with the universally accepted view that a proposition P must be true in order for someone to know that P Instead the infallibilist holds that a person who knows P could not have all of the same evidence or justification that one currently has if P were false and therefore that one s evidence justification offers a guarantee of the truth of P Thus in cases where a person could have held the same true belief P with the same level of evidence or justification and still been wrong the infallibilist holds that the person does not know P The infallibilist defines knowledge in the following way A person henceforth S knows that a proposition henceforth P is true if and only if P is true S believes that P is true S is justified in their belief that P is true S s justification guarantees the truth of P According to the infallibilist fallible beliefs may be rationally justified but they do not rise to the level of knowledge unless their truth is absolutely certain given one s evidence The contrary view to infallibilism known as fallibilism is the position that a justified true belief may be considered knowledge even if one s evidence does not guarantee its truth or even if one can rationally doubt it given one s current evidence Infallibilism should not be confused with skepticism which is the view that knowledge is unattainable for rational human beings While numerous critics of infallibilism claim that defining knowledge according to such high standards collapses into epistemic skepticism many proponents of infallibilism although not all deny that this is the case HistoryRene Descartes an early proponent of infallibilism argued my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable than from what is manifestly false Contemporary infallibilismInfallibilism is rejected by most contemporary epistemologists who generally accept that one can have knowledge based on fallible justification Baron Reed has provided an account of the reasons why infallibilism is so widely regarded as untenable today Broad consensus notwithstanding some contemporary philosophers have presented arguments in defense of infallibilism and have therefore come to reject fallibilism For instance Mark Kaplan defends such a view in a 2006 paper entitled If You Know You Can t Be Wrong Other notable contemporary proponents of infallibilism include Andrew Moon Julien Dutant and Matthew Benton See alsoInfallibilityReferencesLacewing Michael 2013 Infallibilism and the Cartesian circle PDF A Level Philosophy Archived from the original PDF on March 4 2016 Retrieved Oct 11 2015 Rysiew Patrick 7 September 2007 Epistemic Contextualism Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Retrieved 20 June 2020 Reed Baron 2 February 2008 Certainty Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Retrieved 20 June 2020 Descartes Rene 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy Routledge ISBN 978 0 415 07707 1 Reed Baron 7 June 2001 How to Think about Fallibilism PDF University of Washington Course Server Retrieved Oct 11 2015 Kaplan Mark 2006 If You Know You Can t be Wrong In Hetherington Stephen ed Epistemology Futures Oxford University Press pp 180 198 See Moon Andrew 2012 Warrant does entail truth Synthese 184 3 287 297 doi 10 1007 s11229 010 9815 2 S2CID 9851726 Dutant Julien 2016 How to Be an Infallibilist PDF Philosophical Issues 26 148 171 doi 10 1111 phis 12085 and Benton Matthew 2021 Knowledge Hope and Fallibilism Synthese 198 1673 1689 doi 10 1007 s11229 018 1794 8 S2CID 46955518
