Cultural Revolution

Author: www.NiNa.Az
Feb 05, 2025 / 12:03

The Cultural Revolution formally known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a sociopolitical movement in the

Cultural Revolution
Cultural Revolution
Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution, formally known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was a sociopolitical movement in the People's Republic of China (PRC). It was launched by Mao Zedong in 1966 and lasted until 1976. Its publicly stated goal was to preserve Chinese socialism by purging remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society.

Cultural Revolution
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Propaganda poster depicting Mao Zedong, above a group of soldiers from the People's Liberation Army. The caption reads, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the great school of Mao Zedong Thought".
Duration16 May 1966 – 6 October 1976 (1966-05-16 – 1976-10-06) (10 years and 143 days)
LocationChina
MotivePreservation of communism by purging capitalist and traditional elements, and power struggle between Maoists and pragmatists.
Organized byChinese Communist Party Politburo
OutcomeEconomic activity impaired, historical and cultural material destroyed.
DeathsEstimates vary from hundreds of thousands to millions (see § Death toll)
Property damageCemetery of Confucius, Temple of Heaven, Ming tombs
ArrestsJiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen
Cultural Revolution
Chinese文化大革命
Literal meaning"Great Cultural Revolution"
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinWénhuà dàgémìng
Bopomofoㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋ
Gwoyeu RomatzyhWenhuah dahgerminq
Wade–GilesWen2-hua4 ta4-ko2-ming4
Tongyong PinyinWún-huà dà-gé-mìng
IPA[wə̌n.xwâ tâ.kɤ̌.mîŋ]
Wu
RomanizationVenho du kehmin
Hakka
Pha̍k-fa-sṳVùn-fa thai-kiet-min
Yue: Cantonese
Yale RomanizationMàhn-faa daaih-gaak-mihng
Jyutpingman4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6
IPA[mɐn˩ fa˧ taj˨ kak̚˧ mɪŋ˨]
Southern Min
Hokkien POJBûn-hoà tāi-kek-bēng
Eastern Min
Fuzhou BUCÙng-huá dâi gáik-mêng
Formal name
Simplified Chinese无产阶级文化大革命
Traditional Chinese無產階級文化大革命
Literal meaning"Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinWúchǎnjiējí wénhuà dàgémìng
Bopomofoㄨˊ ㄔㄢˇ ㄐㄧㄝ ㄐㄧˊ ㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋ
Wade–GilesWu2-chʻan2-chieh1-chi2 wen2-hua4 ta4-ko2-ming4
Tongyong PinyinWú-chǎn-jie-jí wún-huà dà-gé-mìng
IPA[ǔ.ʈʂʰàn.tɕjé.tɕǐ wə̌n.xwâ tâ.kɤ̌.mîŋ]
Wu
RomanizationVutshaeciacih venho du kehmin
Hakka
Pha̍k-fa-sṳVû-sán-kiê-kip vùn-fa thai-kiet-min
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutpingmou4 caan2 gaai1 kap1 man4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6
IPA[mɔw˩ tsʰan˧˥ kaj˥ kʰɐp̚˥ mɐn˩ fa˧ taj˨ kak̚˧ mɪŋ˨]
Southern Min
Hokkien POJBû-sán-kai-kip bûn-hòa tōa kek-bēng
Eastern Min
Fuzhou BUCÙ-sāng-găi-ngék ùng-huá dâi gáik-mêng

In May 1966, with the help of the Cultural Revolution Group, Mao launched the Revolution and said that bourgeois elements had infiltrated the government and society with the aim of restoring capitalism. Mao called on young people to bombard the headquarters, and proclaimed that "to rebel is justified". Mass upheaval began in Beijing with Red August in 1966. Many young people, mainly students, responded by forming cadres of Red Guards throughout the country. Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung became revered within his cult of personality. In 1967, emboldened radicals began seizing power from local governments and party branches, establishing new revolutionary committees in their place while smashing public security, procuratorate and judicial systems. These committees often split into rival factions, precipitating armed clashes among the radicals. After the fall of Lin Biao in 1971, the Gang of Four became influential in 1972, and the Revolution continued until Mao's death in 1976, soon followed by the arrest of the Gang of Four.

The Cultural Revolution was characterized by violence and chaos across Chinese society. Estimates of the death toll vary widely, typically ranging from 1–2 million, including a massacre in Guangxi that included acts of cannibalism, as well as massacres in Beijing, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, Yunnan, Hunan and so on. Red Guards sought to destroy the Four Olds (old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits), which often took the form of destroying historical artifacts, cultural and religious sites. Tens of millions were persecuted, including senior officials such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Dehuai; millions were persecuted for being members of the Five Black Categories, with intellectuals and scientists labelled as the Stinking Old Ninth. The country's schools and universities were closed, and the National College Entrance Examination were cancelled. Over 10 million youth from urban areas were relocated under the Down to the Countryside Movement.

In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the new paramount leader of China, replacing Mao's successor Hua Guofeng. Deng and his allies introduced the Boluan Fanzheng program and initiated reforms and opening of China, which, together with the New Enlightenment movement, gradually dismantled the ideology of Cultural Revolution. In 1981, the Communist Party publicly acknowledged numerous failures of the Cultural Revolution, declaring it "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the people, the country, and the party since the founding of the People's Republic." Given its broad scope and social impact, memories and perspectives of the Cultural Revolution are varied and complex in contemporary China. It is often referred to as the "ten years of chaos" (十年动乱; shí nián dòngluàn) or "ten years of havoc" (十年浩劫; shí nián hàojié).

Etymology

The terminology of cultural revolution appeared in communist party discourses and newspapers prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China. During this period, the term was used interchangeably with "cultural construction" and referred to eliminating illiteracy in order to widen public participation in civic matters. This usage of "cultural revolution" continued through the 1950s and into the 1960s, and often involved drawing parallels to the May Fourth Movement or the Soviet cultural revolution of 1928–1931.: 56 

Background

Creation of the People's Republic

On 1 October 1949, Mao Zedong declared the People's Republic of China, symbolically bringing the decades-long Chinese Civil War to a close. Remaining Republican forces fled to Taiwan, and continued to resist the People's Republic in various ways. Many soldiers of the Chinese Republicans were left in mainland China, and Mao Zedong launched the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries to eliminate these soldiers left behind, as well as elements of Chinese society viewed as potentially dangerous to Mao's new government.

Great Leap Forward

The Great Leap Forward, similar to the Five-year plans of the Soviet Union, was Mao Zedong's proposal to make the newly created People's Republic of China an industrial superpower. Beginning in 1958, the Great Leap Forward did produce, at least on the surface, incredible industrialization, but also caused the Great Chinese Famine, while still falling short of projected goals. In early 1962, at CCP's Seven Thousand Cadres Conference, Mao made self-criticism, after which he took a semi-retired role, leaving future responsibilities to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping.

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Rural workers smelting iron during the nighttime in 1958
The Great Leap Forward stemmed from multiple factors, including "the purge of intellectuals, the surge of less-educated radicals, the need to find new ways to generate domestic capital, rising enthusiasm about the potential results mass mobilization might produce, and reaction against the sociopolitical results of the Soviet's development strategy."[6] Mao ambitiously sought an increase in rural grain production and an increase in industrial activity. Mao was dismissive of technical experts and basic economic principles, which meant that industrialization of the countryside would solely be dependent on the peasants. Grain quotas were introduced with the idea of having peasants provide grains for themselves and support urban areas. Output from the industrial activities such as steel was also supposed to be used for urban growth.[6] Local officials were fearful of the so-called "Anti-Right Deviation Struggle" and they competed to fulfill or over-fulfill quotas which were based on Mao's exaggerated claims, collecting non-existent "surpluses" and leaving farmers to starve to death. Higher officials did not dare to report the economic disaster which was being caused by these policies, and national officials, blaming bad weather for the decline in food output, took little or no action.

Impact of international tensions and anti-revisionism

In the early 1950s, the PRC and the Soviet Union (USSR) were the world's two largest communist states. Although initially they were mutually supportive, disagreements arose after Nikita Khrushchev took power in the USSR. In 1956, Khrushchev denounced his predecessor Josef Stalin and his policies, and began implementing economic reforms. Mao and many other CCP members opposed these changes, believing that they would damage the worldwide communist movement.: 4–7 

Mao believed that Khrushchev was a revisionist, altering Marxist–Leninist concepts, which Mao claimed would give capitalists control of the USSR. Relations soured. The USSR refused to support China's case for joining the United Nations and reneged on its pledge to supply China with a nuclear weapon.: 4–7 

Mao denounced revisionism in April 1960. Without pointing at the USSR, Mao criticized its Balkan ally, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In turn, the USSR criticized China's Balkan ally, the Party of Labour of Albania. In 1963, CCP began to denounce the USSR, publishing nine polemics.: 7 

Other Soviet actions increased concerns about potential fifth columnists. As a result of the tensions following the Sino-Soviet split, Soviet leaders authorized radio broadcasts into China stating that the Soviet Union would assist "genuine communists" who overthrew Mao and his "erroneous course".: 141  Chinese leadership also feared the increasing military conflict between the United States and North Vietnam, concerned that China's support would lead to the United States to seek out potential Chinese assets.: 141 

Socialist Education Movement and Hai Rui Dismissed from Office

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The purge of General Luo Ruiqing solidified the PLA's loyalty to Mao

In 1963, Mao launched the Socialist Education Movement. Mao set the scene by "cleansing" powerful Beijing officials of questionable loyalty. His approach was executed via newspaper articles, internal meetings, and by his network of political allies.

In late 1959, historian and deputy mayor of Beijing Wu Han published a historical drama entitled Hai Rui Dismissed from Office. In the play, an honest civil servant, Hai Rui, is dismissed by a corrupt emperor. While Mao initially praised the play, in February 1965, he secretly commissioned Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan to publish an article criticizing it. Yao described the play as an allegory attacking Mao; flagging Mao as the emperor, and Peng Dehuai, who had previously questioned Mao during the Lushan Conference, as the honest civil servant.: 15–18 

Yao's article put Beijing mayor Peng Zhen on the defensive. Peng, Wu Han's direct superior, was the head of the Five Man Group, a committee commissioned by Mao to study the potential for a cultural revolution. Peng Zhen, aware that he would be implicated if Wu indeed wrote an "anti-Mao" play, wished to contain Yao's influence. Yao's article was initially published only in select local newspapers. Peng forbade its publication in the nationally distributed People's Daily and other major newspapers under his control, and not pay heed to Yao's petty politics.: 14–19  While the "literary battle" against Peng raged, Mao fired Yang Shangkun—director of the party's General Office, an organ that controlled internal communications—making unsubstantiated charges. He installed loyalist Wang Dongxing, head of Mao's security detail. Yang's dismissal likely emboldened Mao's allies to move against their factional rivals.: 14–19 

On 12 February 1966, the "Five Man Group" issued a report known as the February Outline. The Outline as sanctioned by the party center defined Hai Rui as a constructive academic discussion and aimed to distance Peng Zhen formally from any political implications. However, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan continued their denunciations. Meanwhile, Mao sacked Propaganda Department director Lu Dingyi, a Peng ally.: 20–27 

Lu's removal gave Maoists unrestricted access to the press. Mao delivered his final blow to Peng at a high-profile Politburo meeting through loyalists Kang Sheng and Chen Boda. They accused Peng of opposing Mao, labeled the February Outline "evidence of Peng Zhen's revisionism", and grouped him with three other disgraced officials as part of the "Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang Anti-Party Clique".: 20–27  On 16 May, the Politburo formalized the decisions by releasing an official document condemning Peng and his "anti-party allies" in the strongest terms, disbanding his "Five Man Group", and replacing it with the Maoist Cultural Revolution Group (CRG).: 27–35 

1966: Outbreak

The Cultural Revolution can be divided into two main periods:

  • spring 1966 to summer 1968 (when most of the key events took place)
  • a tailing period that lasted until fall 1976

The early phase was characterized by mass movement and political pluralization. Virtually anyone could create a political organization, even without party approval. Known as Red Guards, these organizations originally arose in schools and universities and later in factories and other institutions. After 1968, most of these organizations ceased to exist, although their legacies were a topic of controversy later.

Notification

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The 16 May Notification

In May 1966, an expanded session of the Politburo was called in Beijing. The conference was laden with Maoist political rhetoric on class struggle and filled with meticulously prepared 'indictments' of recently ousted leaders such as Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing. One of these documents, distributed on 16 May, was prepared with Mao's personal supervision and was particularly damning:: 39–40 

Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army, and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through; others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev for example, who are still nestling beside us.: 47 

Later known as the "16 May Notification", this document summarized Mao's ideological justification for CR.: 40  Initially kept secret, distributed only among high-ranking party members, it was later declassified and published in People's Daily on 17 May 1967.: 41  Effectively it implied that enemies of the Communist cause could be found within the Party: class enemies who "wave the red flag to oppose the red flag." The only way to identify these people was through "the telescope and microscope of Mao Zedong Thought.": 46  While the party leadership was relatively united in approving Mao's agenda, many Politburo members were not enthusiastic, or simply confused about the direction.: 13  The charges against party leaders such as Peng disturbed China's intellectual community and the eight non-Communist parties.: 41 

Mass rallies (May–June)

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"Sweep Away All Cow Demons and Snake Spirits", an editorial published on the front page of People's Daily on 1 June 1966, calling for the proletariat to "completely eradicate" the "Four Olds [...] that have poisoned the people of China for thousands of years, fostered by the exploiting classes".: 50 

After the purge of Peng Zhen, the Beijing Party Committee effectively ceased to function, paving the way for disorder in the capital. On 25 May, under the guidance of  [zh]—wife of Mao loyalist Kang Sheng—Nie Yuanzi, a philosophy lecturer at Peking University, authored a big-character poster along with other leftists and posted it to a public bulletin. Nie attacked the university's party administration and its leader Lu Ping. Nie insinuated that the university leadership, much like Peng, were trying to contain revolutionary fervor in a "sinister" attempt to oppose the party and advance revisionism.: 56–58 

Mao promptly endorsed Nie's poster as "the first Marxist big-character poster in China". Approved by Mao, the poster rippled across educational institutions. Students began to revolt against their school's party establishments. Classes were cancelled in Beijing primary and secondary schools, followed by a decision on 13 June to expand the class suspension nationwide. By early June, throngs of young demonstrators lined the capital's major thoroughfares holding giant portraits of Mao, beating drums, and shouting slogans.: 59–61 

When the dismissal of Peng and the municipal party leadership became public in early June, confusion was widespread. The public and foreign missions were kept in the dark on the reason for Peng's ousting. Top Party leadership was caught off guard by the sudden protest wave and struggled with how to respond. After seeking Mao's guidance in Hangzhou, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping decided to send in 'work teams'—effectively 'ideological guidance' squads of cadres—to the city's schools and People's Daily to restore some semblance of order and re-establish party control.: 62–64 

The work teams had a poor understanding of student sentiment. Unlike the political movement of the 1950s that squarely targeted intellectuals, the new movement was focused on established party cadres, many of whom were part of the work teams. As a result, the work teams came under increasing suspicion as thwarting revolutionary fervor.: 71  Party leadership subsequently became divided over whether or not work teams should continue. Liu Shaoqi insisted on continuing work-team involvement and suppressing the movement's most radical elements, fearing that the movement would spin out of control.: 75 

Bombard the Headquarters (July)

Mao–Liu conflict
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In 1966, Mao broke with Liu Shaoqi (right), then serving as President, over the work-teams issue. Mao's polemic Bombard the Headquarters was widely recognized as targeting Liu, the purported "bourgeois" party headquarters
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Mao waves to the crowd on the banks of the Yangtze before his swim across, July 1966

In July, Mao, in Wuhan, crossed the Yangtze River, showing his vigor. He then returned from Wuhan to Beijing and criticized party leadership for its handling of the work-teams issue. Mao accused the work teams of undermining the student movement, calling for their full withdrawal on 24 July. Several days later a rally was held at the Great Hall of the People to announce the decision and reveal the tone of the movement to teachers and students. At the rally, Party leaders encouraged the masses to 'not be afraid' and take charge of the movement, free of Party interference.: 81–84 

The work-teams issue marked a decisive defeat for Liu; it also signaled that disagreement over how to handle the CR's unfolding events would irreversibly split Mao from the party leadership. On 1 August, the Eleventh Plenum of the 8th Central Committee was convened to advance Mao's radical agenda. At the plenum, Mao showed disdain for Liu, repeatedly interrupting him as he delivered his opening day speech.: 94 

Red Guards in Beijing
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From left: (1) Students at Beijing Normal University making big-character posters denouncing Liu Shaoqi; (2) Big-characters posted at Peking University; (3) Students at No. 23 Middle School in Beijing reading People's Daily during the "Resume Classes" campaign

On 28 July, Red Guard representatives wrote to Mao, calling for rebellion and upheaval to safeguard the revolution. Mao then responded to the letters by writing his own big-character poster entitled Bombard the Headquarters, rallying people to target the "command centre (i.e., Headquarters) of counterrevolution." Mao wrote that despite having undergone a communist revolution, a "bourgeois" elite was still thriving in "positions of authority" in the government and Party.

This statement has been interpreted as a direct indictment of the party establishment under Liu and Deng—the purported "bourgeois headquarters" of China. The personnel changes at the Plenum reflected a radical re-design of the party hierarchy. Liu and Deng kept their seats on the Politburo Standing Committee, but were sidelined from day-to-day party affairs. Lin Biao was elevated to become the CCP's number-two; Liu's rank went from second to eighth and was no longer Mao's heir apparent.

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A struggle session targeting Liu Shaoqi's wife Wang Guangmei

Along with the top leadership losing power the entire national Party bureaucracy was purged. The extensive Organization Department, in charge of party personnel, virtually ceased to exist. The top officials in the Propaganda Department were sacked, with many of its functions folded into the CRG.: 96 

Red August and the Sixteen Points

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Mao and Lin Biao surrounded by rallying Red Guards in Beijing, December 1966

Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung led the Red Guards to commit to their objective as China's future.: 107  By December 1967, 350 million copies had been printed.: 61–64 

During the Red August of Beijing, on 8 August 1966, the party's General Committee passed its "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," later to be known as the "Sixteen Points". This decision defined the Cultural Revolution as "a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country:": 92–93 

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavour to stage a comeback. The proletariat must do the exact opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie ... to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.

The implications of the Sixteen Points were far-reaching. It elevated what was previously a student movement to a nationwide mass campaign that would galvanize workers, farmers, soldiers and lower-level party functionaries to rise, challenge authority, and re-shape the superstructure of society.

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Tiananmen Square on 15 September 1966, the occasion of Chairman Mao's third of eight mass rallies with Red Guards in 1966.

On 18 August in Beijing, over a million Red Guards from across the country gathered in and around Tiananmen Square for an audience with the chairman.: 106–107  Mao mingled with Red Guards and encouraged them, donning a Red Guard armband. Lin also took centre stage, denouncing perceived enemies in society that were impeding the "progress of the revolution".: 66  Subsequently, violence escalated in Beijing and quickly spread.: xvi  The 18 August rally was filmed and shown to approximately 100 million people in its first month of release.: 53 

On 22 August, a central directive was issued to prevent police intervention in Red Guard activities, and those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled counter-revolutionaries. Central officials lifted restraints on violent behavior. Xie Fuzhi, the national police chief, often pardoned Red Guards for their "crimes".: 124–126 

The campaign included incidents of torture, murder, and public humiliation. Many people who were indicted as counter-revolutionaries died by suicide. During Red August, 1,772 people were murdered in Beijing; many of the victims were teachers who were attacked or killed by their own students. In September, Shanghai experienced 704 suicides and 534 deaths; in Wuhan, 62 suicides and 32 murders occurred during the same period.: 124  Peng Dehuai was brought to Beijing to be publicly ridiculed.

Destruction of the Four Olds (August–November)

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The remains of Wanli Emperor at the Ming tombs. Red Guards dragged the remains of the Wanli Emperor and Empresses to the front of the tomb, where they were posthumously "denounced" and burned

Between August and November 1966, eight mass rallies were held, drawing in 12 million people, most of whom were Red Guards.: 106  The government bore the travel expenses of Red Guards.: 110 

At the rallies, Lin called for the destruction of the Four Olds; namely, old customs, culture, habits, and ideas.: 66 : 146  Some changes associated with the Four Olds campaign were mainly benign, such as assigning new names to city streets, places, and even people; millions of babies were born with "revolutionary" names.

Other aspects were more destructive, particularly in the realms of culture and religion. Historical sites throughout the country were destroyed. The damage was particularly pronounced in the capital, Beijing. Red Guards laid siege to the Temple of Confucius in Qufu,: 119  and other historically significant tombs and artifacts.

Libraries of historical and foreign texts were destroyed; books were burned. Temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and cemeteries were closed and sometimes converted to other uses, or looted and destroyed. Marxist propaganda depicted Buddhism as superstition, and religion was looked upon as a means of hostile foreign infiltration, as well as an instrument of the ruling class. Clergy were arrested and sent to camps; many Tibetan Buddhists were forced to participate in the destruction of their monasteries at gunpoint.

Central Work Conference (October)

In October 1966, Mao convened a Central Work Conference, mostly to enlist party leaders who had not yet adopted the latest ideology. Liu and Deng were prosecuted and begrudgingly offered self-criticism.: 137  After the conference, Liu, once a powerful moderate pundit, was placed under house arrest, then sent to a detention camp, where he was denied medical treatment and died in 1969. Deng was sent away for a period of re-education three times and was eventually sent to work in an engine factory in Jiangxi. Rebellion by party cadres accelerated after the conference.

End of the year

On 5 October, the Central Military Commission and the PLA's Department of General Political Tasks directed military academies to dismiss their classes to allow cadets to become more involved in the Cultural Revolution.: 147  In doing so, they were acting on Lin Biao's 23 August 1966 for "three month turmoil" in the PLA.: 147 

In Macau, rioting broke out during the 12-3 incident.: 84  The event was prompted by the colonial government's delays in approving a new wing for a CCP elementary school in Taipa.: 84  The school board illegally began construction, but the colonial government sent police to stop the workers. Several people were injured in the resulting melee. On December 3, 1966, two days of rioting occurred in which hundreds were injured and six to eight were killed, leading to a total clampdown by the Portuguese government. The event set in motion Portugal's de facto abdication of control over Macau, putting Macau on the path to eventual absorption by China.: 84–85 

By the beginning of 1967, a wide variety of grassroots political organizations had formed. Beyond Red Guard and student rebel groups, these included poor peasant associations, workers' pickets, and Mao Zedong Thought study societies, among others. Communist Party leaders encouraged these groups to "join up", and these groups joined various coalitions and held various cross-group congresses and assemblies.: 60 

1967: Seizure of power

Mass organizations coalesced into two factions, the radicals who backed Mao's purge of the Communist party, and the conservatives who backed the moderate party establishment. The "support the left" policy was established in January 1967. Mao's policy was to support the rebels in seizing power; it required the PLA to support "the broad masses of the revolutionary leftists in their struggle to seize power."

In March 1967, the policy was adapted into the "Three Supports and Two Militaries" initiative, in which PLA troops were sent to schools and work units across the country to stabilize political tumult and end factional warfare.: 345  The three "Supports" were to "support the left", "support the interior", "support industry". The "two Militaries" referred to "military management" and "military training".: 345  The policy of supporting the left failed to define "leftists" at a time when almost all mass organizations claimed to be "leftist" or "revolutionary". PLA commanders had developed close working relations with the party establishment, leading many military units to repress radicals.

Spurred by the events in Beijing, power seizure groups formed across the country and began expanding into factories and the countryside. In Shanghai, a young factory worker named Wang Hongwen organized a far-reaching revolutionary coalition, one that displaced existing Red Guard groups. On 3 January 1967, with support from CRG heavyweights Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, the group of firebrand activists overthrew the Shanghai municipal government under Chen Pixian in what became known as the January Storm, and formed in its place the Shanghai People's Commune.: 115  Mao then expressed his approval.

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Rebel factions of Red Guards marching in Shanghai, 1967

Shanghai's was the first provincial level government overthrown. Provincial governments and many parts of the state and party bureaucracy were affected, with power seizures taking place. In the next three weeks, 24 more province-level governments were overthrown."Revolutionary committees" were subsequently established, in place of local governments and branches of the Communist Party. For example, in Beijing, three separate revolutionary groups declared power seizures on the same day. In Heilongjiang, local party secretary Pan Fusheng seized power from the party organization under his own leadership. Some leaders even wrote the CRG asking to be overthrown.: 170–72 

In Beijing, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao targeted Vice-Premier Tao Zhu. The power-seizure movement was appearing in the military as well. In February, prominent generals Ye Jianying and Chen Yi, as well as Vice-Premier Tan Zhenlin, vocally asserted their opposition to the more extreme aspects of the movement, with some party elders insinuating that the CRG's real motives were to remove the revolutionary old guard. Mao, initially ambivalent, took to the Politburo floor on 18 February to denounce the opposition directly, endorsing the radicals' activities. This resistance was branded the "February Countercurrent": 195–196 —effectively silencing critics within the party.: 207–209 

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Red Guards marching in Guizhou, 1967. The banner in the center reads: "The People's Liberation Army firmly supports the proletarian revolutionary faction."

Although in early 1967 popular insurgencies were limited outside of the biggest cities, local governments began collapsing all across China.: 21  Revolutionaries dismantled ruling government and party organizations, because power seizures lacked centralized leadership, it was no longer clear who believed in Mao's revolutionary vision and who was exploiting the chaos for their own gain. The formation of rival revolutionary groups and manifestations of long-established local feuds, led to violent struggles between factions.

Tension grew between mass organizations and the military. In response, Lin Biao issued a directive for the army to aid the radicals. At the same time, the army took control of some provinces and locales that were deemed incapable of handling the power transition.: 219–221 

In Wuhan, as in many other cities, two major revolutionary organizations emerged, one supporting and one attacking the conservative establishment. Chen Zaidao, the Army general in charge of the area, forcibly repressed the anti-establishment demonstrators. Mao flew to Wuhan with a large entourage of central officials in an attempt to secure military loyalty in the area. On 20 July 1967, local agitators in response kidnapped Mao's emissary Wang Li, in what became known as the Wuhan Incident. Subsequently, Chen was sent to Beijing and tried by Jiang Qing and the rest of the CRG. Chen's resistance was the last major open display of opposition within the PLA.: 214 

The Gang of Four's Zhang Chunqiao admitted that the most crucial factor in the Cultural Revolution was not the Red Guards or the CRG or the "rebel worker" organisations, but the PLA. When the PLA local garrison supported Mao's radicals, they were able to take over the local government successfully, but if they were not cooperative, the takeovers were unsuccessful.: 175  Violent clashes occurred in virtually all major cities.

In response to the Wuhan Incident, Mao and Jiang began establishing a "workers' armed self-defense force", a "revolutionary armed force of mass character" to counter what he saw as rightism in "75% of the PLA officer corps". Meanwhile, a massive movement to "smash gong-jian-fa", or to smash the Police, the Procuratorate and the Court, was carried out in mainland China. The few remaining going-jian-fa organizations were later placed under military control.

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Wuzhong
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Zhengzhou
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Kaifeng
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Shanghai
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Lianyuan
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Chongqing
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Guangzhou
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Some locations of armed conflict between rebel factions during the summer of 1967.

In Chongqing, an arms manufacturing center, during August 1967, battles involved close to 10,000 combatants, killed or wounded close to 1,000, and created 180,000 refugees in Chengdu alone. Chaotianmen harbor district was destroyed in a battle involving tanks, mobile artillery, and anti-aircraft guns. In Wuzhong, Ningxia, on 28 August 1967, Kang Sheng gave orders allowing the PLA to fire on opposing Hui Muslim factions, killing approximately 100 people and wounding 133. In Zhengzhou and Kaifeng, factory clashes killed 37, wounded 290, and led to 300 "prisoners of war", two of whom were buried alive. At Shanghai Diesel Engine Plant, a battle in which Wang Hongwen led the victorious faction, killed 18 and wounded 983. In Lianyuan, fighting during July and August 1967 killed six and wounded 68. In Wenzhou, on 13 August 1967, two PLA units mistook each other for rebels and opened fire, killing seven people. At Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport, on 10 August 1967, a firefight caused a panicked commercial pilot to depart early, stranding 54 Japanese passengers. Military control was imposed over the Daqing Oil Field in March 1967 and over the Anshan Iron and Steel Plant in August.: 214–217 

Unconventional weapons, including weapon of mass destruction, were seized during conflicts, but not directly used. Citizens wrote letters to the Zhongnanhai residence of government leaders, warning of attacks on facilities that stored pathogenic bacteria, poisonous plant samples, radioactive substances, poison gas, toxicants, and other dangerous substances. In Changchun, rebels working in geological institutes developed and tested the first ever dirty bomb, testing two "radioactive self-defense bombs" and two "radioactive self-defense mines" on 6 and 11 August.: 218–220 

Nationwide, a total of 18.77 million firearms, 14,828 artillery pieces, 2,719,545 grenades ended up in civilian hands. They were used in the course of violent struggles, which mostly took place from 1967 to 1968. In Chongqing, Xiamen, and Changchun, tanks, armored vehicles and even warships were deployed in combat.

During the Cultural Revolution, Mao emphasized the need to improve medical care in rural China.: 270  The Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS) developed in the late 1960s.: 270  In this system, each large production brigade established a medical cooperative station staffed by barefoot doctors.: 270  The medical cooperative stations provided primary health care.: 270 Barefoot doctors brought healthcare to rural areas where urban-trained doctors would not settle. They promoted basic hygiene, preventive healthcare, and family planning and treated common illnesses. Immunizations were provided free of charge.: 9  Public healthcare was highly effective in curbing infectious diseases in rural China.: 9  For treatment of major diseases, rural people traveled to state-owned hospitals.: 270 

1968: Purges

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A rally in opposition to Liu Shaoqi

In May 1968, Mao launched a massive political purge. Many people were sent to the countryside to work in reeducation camps. Generally, the campaign targeted rebels from the CR's earlier, more populist, phase.: 239  On 27 July, the Red Guards' power over the PLA was officially ended, and the establishment sent in units to besiege areas that remained untouched by the Guards. A year later, the Red Guard factions were dismantled entirely; Mao predicted that the chaos might begin running its own agenda and be tempted to turn against revolutionary ideology. Their purpose had been largely fulfilled; Mao and his radical colleagues had largely overturned established power.[citation needed]

Liu was expelled from the CCP at the 12th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in September, and labelled the "headquarters of the bourgeoisie".

Mao meets with Red Guard leaders (July)

As the Red Guard movement had waned over the preceding year, violence by the remaining Red Guards increased on some Beijing campuses. Violence was particularly pronounced at Qinghua University, where a few thousand hardliners of two factions continued to fight. At Mao's initiative, on 27 July 1968, tens of thousands of workers entered the Qinghua campus shouting slogans in opposition to the violence. Red Guards attacked the workers, who remained peaceful. Ultimately, the workers disarmed the students and occupied the campus.: 205–206 

On 28 July, Mao and the Central Group met with the five most important remaining Beijing Red Guard leaders to address the movement's excessive violence and political exhaustion.: 205–206  It was the only time during the Cultural Revolution that Mao met and addressed the student leaders directly. In response to a Red Guard leader's telegram sent prior to the meeting, which claimed that some "Black Hand" had maneuvered the workers against the Red Guards, Mao told the student leaders, "The Black Hand is nobody else but me! ... I asked [the workers] how to solve the armed fighting in the universities, and told them to go there to have a look.": 210 

During the meeting, Mao and the Central Group for the Cultural Revolution stated, "[W]e want cultural struggle, we do not want armed struggle" and "The masses do not want civil war.": 217 

You have been involved in the Cultural Revolution for two years: struggle-criticism-transformation. Now, first, you're not struggling; second, you're not criticizing; and third, you're not transforming. Or rather, you are struggling, but it's an armed struggle. The people are not happy, the workers are not happy, city residents are not happy, most people in schools are not happy, most of the students even in your schools are not happy. Even within the faction that supports you, there are unhappy people. Is this the way to unify the world?

Mao's cult of personality and "mango fever" (August)

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A propaganda oil painting of Mao during the Cultural Revolution (1967)

In the spring of 1968, a massive campaign aimed at enhancing Mao's reputation began. On 4 August, Mao was presented with mangoes by the Pakistani foreign minister Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, in an apparent diplomatic gesture. Mao had his aide send the box of mangoes to his propaganda team at Tsinghua University on 5 August, who were stationed there to quiet strife among Red Guard factions.

Several months of "mango fever" followed as the fruit became a focus of a "boundless loyalty" campaign for Mao. More replica mangoes were created, and the replicas were sent on tour around Beijing and elsewhere. Many revolutionary committees visited the mangoes in Beijing from outlying provinces. Approximately half a million people greeted the replicas when they arrived in Chengdu. Badges and wall posters featuring the mangoes and Mao were produced in the millions.

The fruit was shared among all institutions that had been a part of the propaganda team, and large processions were organized in support of the "precious gift", as the mangoes were known. A dentist in a small town, Dr. Han, saw the mango and said it was nothing special and looked just like a sweet potato. He was put on trial for "malicious slander", found guilty, paraded publicly throughout the town, and then shot in the head.

It has been claimed that Mao used the mangoes to express support for the workers who would go to whatever lengths necessary to end the factional fighting among students, and a "prime example of Mao's strategy of symbolic support." Through early 1969, participants of Mao Zedong Thought study classes in Beijing returned with mass-produced mango facsimiles, gaining media attention in the provinces.

Down to the Countryside Movement (December)

In December 1968, Mao began the Down to the Countryside Movement. During this movement, which lasted for the following decade, young bourgeoisie living in cities were ordered to go to the countryside to experience working life. The term "young intellectuals" was used to refer to recent college graduates. In the late 1970s, these students returned to their home cities. Many students who were previously Red Guard supported the movement and Mao's vision. This movement was thus in part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities to the countryside, where they would cause less social disruption. It also served to spread revolutionary ideology geographically.

1969–1971: Lin Biao

The 9th National Congress was held in April 1969. It served as a means to "revitalize" the party with fresh thinking—as well as new cadres, after much of the old guard had been destroyed in the struggles of the preceding years.: 285  The party framework established two decades earlier broke down almost entirely: rather than through an election by party members, delegates for this Congress were effectively selected by Revolutionary Committees.: 288  Representation of the military increased by a large margin from the previous Congress, reflected in the election of more PLA members to the new Central Committee—over 28%. Many officers now elevated to senior positions were loyal to PLA Marshal Lin Biao, which would open a new rift between the military and civilian leadership.: 292 

We do not only feel boundless joy because we have as our great leader the greatest Marxist–Leninist of our era, Chairman Mao, but also great joy because we have Vice Chairman Lin as Chairman Mao's universally recognized successor.

— Premier Zhou Enlai at the 9th Party Congress

Reflecting this, Lin was officially elevated to become the Party's preeminent figure outside of Mao, with his name written into the party constitution as his "closest comrade-in-arms" and "universally recognized successor".: 291  At the time, no other Communist parties or governments anywhere in the world had adopted the practice of enshrining a successor to the current leader into their constitutions. Lin delivered the keynote address at the Congress: a document drafted by hardliner leftists Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao under Mao's guidance.: 289 

The report was heavily critical of Liu Shaoqi and other "counter-revolutionaries" and drew extensively from quotations in the Little Red Book. The Congress solidified the central role of Maoism within the party, re-introducing Maoism as the official guiding ideology in the party constitution. The Congress elected a new Politburo with Mao, Lin, Chen, Zhou Enlai and Kang as the members of the new Politburo Standing Committee.: 290 

Lin, Chen, and Kang were all beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou, who was demoted in rank, voiced his unequivocal support for Lin at the Congress.: 290  Mao restored the function of some formal party institutions, such as the operations of the Politburo, which ceased functioning between 1966 and 1968 because the CCRG held de facto control.: 296 

In early 1970, the nationwide "One Strike-Three Anti Campaign" was launched by Mao and the Communist Party Central, aiming to consolidate the new organs of power by targeting counterrevolutionary thoughts and actions. A large number of "minor criminals" were executed or forced to commit suicide between 1970 and 1972. According to government statistics released after the Cultural Revolution, during the campaign 1.87 million people were persecuted as traitors, spies, and counterrevolutionaries, and over 284,800 were arrested or killed from February to November 1970 alone.

PLA encroachment

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Mao (left) and Lin (right) in 1967, riding in the back of a vehicle during an International Workers' Day parade

Mao's efforts at re-organizing party and state institutions generated mixed results. The situation in some of the provinces remained volatile, even as the political situation in Beijing stabilized. Factional struggles, many violent, continued at a local level despite the declaration that the 9th National Congress marked a temporary victory for the CR.: 316  Furthermore, despite Mao's efforts to put on a show of unity at the Congress, the factional divide between Lin's PLA camp and the Jiang-led radical camp was intensifying. Indeed, a personal dislike of Jiang drew many civilian leaders, including Chen, closer to Lin.: 115 

Between 1966 and 1968, China was isolated internationally, having declared its enmity towards both the USSR and the US. The friction with the USSR intensified after border clashes on the Ussuri River in March 1969 as Chinese leaders prepared for all-out war.: 317  In June 1969, the PLA's enforcement of political discipline and suppression of the factions that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution became intertwined with the central Party's efforts to accelerate Third Front. Those who did not return to work would be viewed as engaging in 'schismatic activity' which risked undermining preparations to defend China from potential invasion.: 150–151 

In October 1969, the Party attempted to focus more on war preparedness and less on suppressing factions.: 151  That month, senior leaders were evacuated from Beijing. Amid the tension, Lin issued the "Order Number One", which appeared to be an executive order to prepare for war to the PLA's eleven military regions on October 18 without going through Mao. This drew the ire of the chairman, who saw it as evidence that his declared successor was usurping his authority.: 317 

The prospect of war elevated the PLA to greater prominence in domestic politics, increasing Lin's stature at Mao's expense.: 321  Some evidence suggests that Mao was pushed to seek closer relations with the US as a means to avoid PLA dominance that would result from a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.: 321  During his later meeting with Richard Nixon in 1972, Mao hinted that Lin had opposed better relations with the U.S.: 322 

Restoration of State Chairman position

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Liu Shaoqi on his deathbed in 1969

After Lin was confirmed as Mao's successor, his supporters focused on the restoration of the position of State Chairman, which had been abolished by Mao after Liu's purge. They hoped that by allowing Lin to ease into a constitutionally sanctioned role, whether Chairman or vice-chairman, Lin's succession would be institutionalized. The consensus within the Politburo was that Mao should assume the office with Lin as vice-chairman; but perhaps wary of Lin's ambitions or for other unknown reasons, Mao voiced his explicit opposition.: 327 

Factional rivalries intensified at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress in Lushan held in late August 1970. Chen, now aligned with the PLA faction loyal to Lin, galvanized support for the restoration of the office of President of China, despite Mao's wishes. Moreover, Chen launched an assault on Zhang, a staunch Maoist who embodied the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, over the evaluation of Mao's legacy.: 328–331 

The attacks on Zhang found favour with many Plenum attendees and may have been construed by Mao as an indirect attack on the CR. Mao confronted Chen openly, denouncing him as a "false Marxist",: 332  and removed him from the Politburo Standing Committee. In addition to the purge of Chen, Mao asked Lin's principal generals to write self-criticisms on their political positions as a warning to Lin. Mao also inducted several of his supporters to the Central Military Commission and placed loyalists in leadership roles of the Beijing Military Region.: 332 

Project 571

By 1971, the diverging interests of the civilian and military leaders was apparent. Mao was troubled by the PLA's newfound prominence, and the purge of Chen marked the beginning of a gradual scaling-down of the PLA's political involvement.: 353  According to official sources, sensing the reduction of Lin's power base and his declining health, Lin's supporters plotted to use the military power still at their disposal to oust Mao in a coup.

Lin's son Lin Liguo, along with other high-ranking military conspirators, formed a coup apparatus in Shanghai and dubbed the plan to oust Mao Outline for Project 571 – in the original Mandarin, the phrase sounds similar to the term for 'military uprising'. It is disputed whether Lin Biao was directly involved in this process. While official sources maintain that Lin did plan and execute the coup attempt, scholars such as Jin Qiu portray Lin as passive, cajoled by elements among his family and supporters. Qiu contests that Lin Biao was ever personally involved in drafting the Outline, with evidence suggesting that Lin Liguo was directly responsible for the draft.

Lin's flight and plane crash

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Graffiti of Lin Biao's foreword to the Little Red Book, with his name (lower right) later scratched out

According to the official narrative, on 13 September Lin Biao, his wife Ye Qun, Lin Liguo, and members of his staff attempted to flee to the USSR ostensibly to seek political asylum. En route, Lin's plane crashed in Mongolia, killing all on board. The plane apparently ran out of fuel. A Soviet investigative team was not able to determine the cause of the crash but hypothesized that the pilot was flying low to evade radar and misjudged the plane's altitude.

The account was questioned by those who raised doubts over Lin's choice of the USSR as a destination, the plane's route, the identity of the passengers, and whether or not a coup was actually taking place.

On 13 September, the Politburo met in an emergency session to discuss Lin. His death was confirmed in Beijing only on 30 September, which led to the cancellation of the National Day celebration events the following day. The Central Committee did not release news of Lin's death to the public until two months later. Many Lin supporters sought refuge in Hong Kong. Those who remained on the mainland were purged.

The event caught the party leadership off guard: the concept that Lin could betray Mao de-legitimized a vast body of Cultural Revolution political rhetoric and by extension, Mao's absolute authority. For several months following the incident, the party information apparatus struggled to find a "correct way" to frame the incident for public consumption, but as the details came to light, the majority of the Chinese public felt disillusioned and realised they had been manipulated for political purposes.

1972–1976: The Gang of Four

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The "Gang of Four", clockwise from top-left: Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Jiang Qing

Mao became depressed and reclusive after the Lin incident. Sensing a sudden loss of direction, Mao reached out to old comrades whom he had denounced in the past. Meanwhile, in September 1972, Mao transferred a 38-year-old cadre from Shanghai, Wang Hongwen, to Beijing and made him Party vice-chairman. Wang, a former factory worker from a peasant background,: 357  was seemingly getting groomed for succession.: 364 

Jiang's position strengthened after Lin's flight. She held tremendous influence with the radical camp. With Mao's health on the decline, Jiang's political ambitions began to emerge. She allied herself with Wang and propaganda specialists Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, forming a political clique later pejoratively dubbed as the Gang of Four.

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Jiang Qing (left) receiving Red Guards in Beijing with Zhou Enlai (center) and Kang Sheng, with each holding a copy of the Little Red Book

By 1973, round after round of political struggles had left many lower-level institutions, including local government, factories, and railways, short of competent staff to carry out basic functions.: 340  China's economy had fallen into disarray, which led to the rehabilitation of purged lower-level officials. The party's core became heavily dominated by Cultural Revolution beneficiaries and radicals, whose focus remained ideological purity over economic productivity. The economy remained mostly Zhou's domain, one of the few remaining moderates. Zhou attempted to restore the economy, but was resented by the Gang of Four, who identified him as their primary political succession threat.

In late 1973, to weaken Zhou's political position and to distance themselves from Lin's apparent betrayal, the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign began under Jiang's leadership.: 366  Its stated goals were to purge China of New Confucianist thinking and denounce Lin's actions as traitorous and regressive.: 372 

Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation (1975)

Deng Xiaoping returned to the political scene, assuming the post of Vice-Premier in March 1973, in the first of a series of Mao-approved promotions. After Zhou withdrew from active politics in January 1975, Deng was effectively put in charge of the government, party, and military, then adding the additional titles of PLA General Chief of Staff, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission.: 381 

Mao wanted to use Deng as a counterweight to the military faction in government to suppress former Lin loyalists. In addition, Mao had also lost confidence in the Gang of Four and saw Deng as the alternative. Leaving the country in grinding poverty would damage the positive legacy of the CR, which Mao worked hard to protect. Deng's return set the scene for a protracted factional struggle between the radical Gang of Four and moderates led by Zhou and Deng.[citation needed]

At the time, Jiang and associates held effective control of mass media and the party's propaganda network, while Zhou and Deng held control of most government organs. On some decisions, Mao sought to mitigate the Gang's influence, but on others, he acquiesced to their demands. The Gang of Four's political and media control did not prevent Deng from enacting his economic policies. Deng emphatically opposed Party factionalism, and his policies aimed to promote unity to restore economic productivity. Much like the post-Great Leap restructuring led by Liu Shaoqi, Deng streamlined the railway system, steel production, etc. By late 1975, however, Mao saw that Deng's economic restructuring might negate the CR's legacy and launched the Counterattack the Right-Deviationist Reversal-of-Verdicts Trend, a campaign to oppose "rehabilitating the case for the rightists", alluding to Deng as the country's foremost "rightist". Mao directed Deng to write self-criticisms in November 1975, a move lauded by the Gang of Four.: 381 

Death of Zhou Enlai

On 8 January 1976, Zhou Enlai died of bladder cancer. On 15 January, Deng delivered Zhou's eulogy in a funeral attended by all of China's most senior leaders with the notable absence of Mao, who had grown increasingly critical of Zhou.: 217–218 : 610  After Zhou's death, Mao selected the relatively unknown Hua Guofeng instead of a member of the Gang of Four or Deng to become Premier.

The Gang of Four grew apprehensive that spontaneous, large-scale popular support for Zhou could turn the political tide against them. They acted through the media to impose restrictions on public displays of mourning for Zhou. Years of resentment over the CR, the public persecution of Deng—seen as Zhou's ally—and the prohibition against public mourning led to a rise in popular discontent against Mao and the Gang of Four. Official attempts to enforce the mourning restrictions included removing public memorials and tearing down posters commemorating Zhou's achievements. On 25 March 1976, Shanghai's Wen Hui Bao published an article calling Zhou "the capitalist roader inside the Party [who] wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader [Deng] regain his power." These propaganda efforts at smearing Zhou's image, however, only strengthened public attachment to Zhou's memory.: 213–214 

Tiananmen incident

On 4 April 1976, on the eve of China's annual Qingming Festival, a traditional day of mourning, thousands of people gathered around the Monument to the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square to commemorate Zhou. They honored Zhou by laying wreaths, banners, poems, placards, and flowers at the foot of the Monument.: 612  The most apparent purpose of this memorial was to eulogize Zhou, but the Gang of Four were also attacked for their actions against the Premier. A small number of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Mao and his Cultural Revolution.: 218 

Up to two million people may have visited Tiananmen Square on 4 April. All levels of society, from the most impoverished peasants to high-ranking PLA officers and the children of high-ranking cadres, were represented in the activities. Those who participated were motivated by a mixture of anger over Zhou's treatment, revolt against the Cultural Revolution and apprehension for China's future. The event did not appear to have coordinated leadership.: 218–220 

The Central Committee, under the leadership of Jiang Qing, labelled the event 'counter-revolutionary' and cleared the square of memorial items shortly after midnight on April 6. Attempts to suppress the mourners led to a riot. Police cars were set on fire, and a crowd of over 100,000 people forced its way into several government buildings surrounding the square. Many of those arrested were later sentenced to prison. Similar incidents occurred in other major cities. Jiang and her allies attacked Deng as the incident's 'mastermind', and issued reports on official media to that effect. Deng was formally stripped of all positions inside and outside the Party on 7 April. This marked Deng's second purge.: 612 

Death of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four's downfall

On 9 September 1976, Mao Zedong died. To Mao's supporters, his death symbolized the loss of China's revolutionary foundation. His death was announced on 9 September. The nation descended into grief and mourning, with people weeping in the streets and public institutions closing for over a week. Hua Guofeng chaired the Funeral Committee and delivered the memorial speech.

Shortly before dying, Mao had allegedly written the message "With you in charge, I'm at ease," to Hua. Hua used this message to substantiate his position as successor. Hua had been widely considered to be lacking in political skill and ambitions, and seemingly posed no serious threat to the Gang of Four in the race for succession. However, the Gang's radical ideas also clashed with influential elders and many Party reformers. With army backing and the support of Marshal Ye Jianying, Director of Central Office Wang Dongxing, Vice Premier Li Xiannian and party elder Chen Yun, on 6 October, the Central Security Bureau's Special Unit 8341 had all members of the Gang of Four arrested in a bloodless coup.

After Mao's death, people characterized as 'beating-smashing-looting elements', who were seen as having disturbed the social order during the CR, were purged or punished. "Beating-smashing-looting elements" had typically been aligned with rebel factions.: 359 

Aftermath

Transitional period

Although Hua denounced the Gang of Four in 1976, he continued to invoke Mao's name to justify Mao-era policies. Hua spearheaded what became known as the Two Whatevers. Like Deng, Hua wanted to reverse the CR's damage; but unlike Deng, who wanted new economic models for China, Hua intended to move the Chinese economic and political system towards Soviet-style planning.

It became increasingly clear to Hua, that without Deng, it was difficult to continue daily affairs of state. On 10 October, Deng wrote a letter to Hua asking to be transferred back to state and party affairs; party elders also called for Deng's return. With increasing pressure from all sides, Premier Hua named Deng Vice-Premier in July 1977, and later promoted him to various other positions, effectively elevating Deng to be China's second-most powerful figure. In August, the 11th National Congress was held in Beijing, officially naming (in ranking order) Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian and Wang Dongxing as new members of the Politburo Standing Committee.

Repudiation and reform under Deng

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Deng Xiaoping became the paramount leader of China in 1978. He started the process of reform and opening up

Deng Xiaoping first proposed what he called Boluan Fanzheng in September 1977 in order to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. In May 1978, Deng seized the opportunity to elevate his protégé Hu Yaobang to power. Hu published an article in the Guangming Daily, making clever use of Mao's quotations, while lauding Deng's ideas. Following this article, Hua began to shift his tone in support of Deng. On 1 July, Deng publicized Mao's self-criticism report of 1962 regarding the failure of the Great Leap Forward. As his power base expanded, in September Deng began openly attacking Hua Guofeng's "Two Whatevers". The "1978 Truth Criterion Discussion", launched by Deng and Hu and their allies, also triggered a decade-long New Enlightenment movement in mainland China, promoting democracy, humanism and universal values, while opposing the ideology of Cultural Revolution.

On 18 December 1978, Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee was held. Deng called for "a liberation of thoughts" and urged the party to "seek truth from facts" and abandon ideological dogma. The Plenum officially marked the beginning of the economic reform era. Hua Guofeng engaged in self-criticism and called his "Two Whatevers" a mistake. At the Plenum, the Party reversed its verdict on the Tiananmen Incident. Former Chinese president Liu Shaoqi was given a belated state funeral. Peng Dehuai, who was persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution was rehabilitated in 1978.

At the Fifth Plenum held in 1980, Peng Zhen, He Long and other leaders who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated. Hu Yaobang became head of the party secretariat as its secretary-general. In September, Hua Guofeng resigned, and Zhao Ziyang, another Deng ally, was named premier. Hua remained on the Central Military Commission, but formal power was transferred to a new generation of pragmatic reformers, who reversed Cultural Revolution policies to a large extent. Within a few years, Deng and Hu helped rehabilitate over 3 million "unjust, false, erroneous" cases. In particular, the trial of the Gang of Four took place in Beijing from 1980 to 1981, and the court stated that 729,511 people had been persecuted by the Gang, of whom 34,800 were said to have died.

In 1981, the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution and declared that the Cultural Revolution was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country, and the people since the founding of the People's Republic."

Atrocities

Death toll

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A struggle session in September 1967 targeting Xi Zhongxun, the father of Xi Jinping, who had been labeled an "anti-party element"

Fatality estimates vary across different sources, ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions, or even tens of millions. In addition to various regimes of secrecy and obfuscation concerning the Revolution, both top-down as perpetuated by authorities, as well as laterally among the Chinese public in the decades since, the discrepancies are due in large part to the totalistic nature of the Revolution itself: it is a significant challenge for historians to discern whether and in what ways discrete events that took place during the Cultural Revolution should be ascribed to it.

Most deaths occurred after the mass movements ended, when organized campaigns attempted to consolidate order in workplaces and communities.: 172  As Walder summarizes, "The cure for factional warfare was far worse than the disease." Serious man-made disasters such as the 1975 Banqiao Dam failure, also caused many deaths.

Literature reviews of the overall death toll due to the Cultural Revolution usually include the following:

Time Source Deaths (in millions) Remarks
2014 Andrew G. Walder 1.1–1.6 Examines the period between 1966 and 1971. Walder reviewed the reported deaths in 2,213 annals from every county and interpreted the annals' vague language in the most conservative manner. For instance, "some died" and "a couple died" were interpreted as zero death, while "death in the scale of tens/hundreds/thousands" were interpreted as "ten/a hundred/a thousand died". The reported deaths underestimate the actual deaths, especially because some annals actively covered up deaths. Annal editors were supervised by the CCP Propaganda Department. In 2003, Walder and Yang Su coauthored a paper along this approach, but with fewer county annals available at the time.
1999 Ding Shu 2 Ding's figures include 100,000 killed in the Red Terror during 1966, with 200,000 forced to commit suicide, plus 300,000–500,000 killed in violent struggles, 500,000 during Cleansing the Class Ranks, 200,000 during One Strike-Three Anti Campaign and the Anti-May Sixteenth Elements Campaign.
1996 CCP History Research Center 1.728 The 1.728 million were counted as "unnatural deaths", among which 9.4% (162,000) were CCP party members and 252,000 were intellectuals. The figures were extracted from 建国以来历次政治运动事实; 'Facts on the Successive Political Movements since the Founding of the PRC', a book by the party's History Research Center, which states that "according to CCP internal investigations in 1978 and 1984 ... 21.44 million were investigated, 125 million got implicated in these investigations; [...] 4.2 million were detained (by Red Guards and other non-police), 1.3 million were arrested by police, 1.728 million of unnatural deaths; [...] 135,000 were executed for crimes of counter-revolution; [...] during violent struggles 237,000 were killed and 7.03 million became disabled". While these internal investigations were never mentioned or published in any other official documents, the scholarly consensus found these figures very reasonable.
1991 Rudolph J. Rummel 7.731 Rummel included his estimate of Laogai camp deaths in this figure. He estimated that 5% of the 10 million people in the Laogai camps died each year of the 12-year period, and that this amounts to roughly 6 million.
1982 Ye Jianying 3.42–20 Several sources have quoted a statement made by Marshal Ye Jianying, of "683,000 deaths in the cities, 2.5 million deaths in the countryside, plus 123,700 deaths due to violent struggles and 115,500 deaths due to struggle sessions and imprisonment, in addition to 557,000 people missing." In a 2012 interview with Hong Kong's Open Magazine, an unnamed bureaucrat in Beijing claimed that Ye made the statement in a 1982 CCP meeting, while he was the party's Vice Chairman. Several sources have also quoted that Marshal Ye estimated the death toll to be 20 million during a CCP working conference in December 1978.
1979 Agence France Presse 0.4 This figure was obtained by an AFP correspondent in Beijing, citing an unnamed but "usually reliable" source. In 1986, Maurice Meisner referred to this number as a "widely accepted nationwide figure", but also said "The toll may well have been higher. It is unlikely that it was less." Jonathan Leightner asserted that the number is "perhaps one of the best estimates".

Massacres

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Quotations of Mao Zedong on a street wall of Wuxuan County, one of the centers of the Guangxi Massacre

Massacres took place across China, including in Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, Yunnan, Hunan, Ruijin, and Qinghai, as well as Red August in Beijing.

These massacres were mainly led and organized by local revolutionary committees, Communist Party branches, militia, and the military. Most victims were members of the Five Black Categories as well as their children, or members of "rebel groups". Chinese scholars have estimated that at least 300,000 people died in these massacres. Collective killings in Guangxi and Guangdong were among the most serious. In Guangxi, the official annals of at least 43 counties have records of massacres, with 15 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000, while in Guangdong at least 28 county annals record massacres, with 6 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000.

Official sources in 1980 revealed that, during the Red August, at least 1,772 people were killed by Red Guards, including teachers and principals of many schools, meanwhile 33,695 homes were ransacked and 85,196 families were forced to flee. The Daxing Massacre in rural Beijing caused the deaths of 325 people from 27 August to 1 September 1966; those killed ranged from 80 years old to a 38-day old baby, with 22 families being completely wiped out.

In Dao County, Hunan, a total of 7,696 people were killed from 13 August to 17 October 1967, in addition to 1,397 forced to commit suicide, and 2,146 becoming permanently disabled.

In the Guangxi Massacre, the official record shows an estimated death toll from 100,000 to 150,000 as well as cannibalism primarily between 1967 and 1968 in Guangxi, where one of the worst violent struggles of the Revolution took place, before Zhou sent the PLA to intervene.: 545 

In 1975, the PLA led a massacre in Yunnan around the town of Shadian, targeting Hui people, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,600 civilians, including 300 children, and the destruction of 4,400 homes.

Violent struggles, struggle sessions, and purges

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The Cultural Revolution Cemetery in Chongqing, where 400–500 people killed in factional clashes are buried, out of a total of at least 1,700 deaths.

Violent struggles were factional conflicts (mostly among Red Guards and "rebel groups") that began in Shanghai and then spread to other areas in 1967. They brought the country to a state of civil war. Weapons used included some 18.77 million guns, 2.72 million grenades, 14,828 cannons, millions of other ammunition and even armored cars and tanks. Notable violent struggles include the battles in Chongqing, in Sichuan, and in Xuzhou. Researchers claimed that the nationwide death toll in violent struggles ranged from 300,000 to 500,000.

The recorded rate of violence rose in 1967, reaching a peak that summer before dropping suddenly. During 1967, casualties were relatively low as the weapons used were primarily clubs, spears, and rocks until late July. Although firearms and heavier weapons began to spread during summer, most were neither trained nor committed fighters and therefore casualties remained relatively low. The peak of collective violence in summer 1967 dropped sharply after August, when Mao became concerned about rebel attacks on local army units and thereafter made clear that his prior calls to "drag out" army commanders was a mistake and he would instead support besieged army commands.: 150 

The greatest number of casualties occurred during the process of restoring order in 1968, although the overall number of violent conflicts was lower. Walder stated that while "rising casualties from a smaller number of insurgent conflicts surely reflected the increasing scale and organizational coherence of rebel factions, and their growing access to military weaponry[,]" another important factor was that "[t]he longer that local factional warfare continued without the prospect of an equitable political settlement, the greater the stakes for the participants and the more intense the collective violence as factions fought to avoid the consequence of losing.": 154–155 

In addition to violent struggles, millions of Chinese were violently persecuted, especially via struggle sessions. Those identified as spies, "running dogs", "revisionists", or coming from a suspect class (including those related to former landlords or rich peasants) were subject to beating, imprisonment, rape, torture, sustained and systematic harassment and abuse, seizure of property, denial of medical attention, and erasure of social identity. Some people were not able to stand the torture and committed suicide. Researchers claimed that at least 100,000 to 200,000 people committed suicide during the early CR.

At the same time, many "unjust, false, and mistaken" cases appeared due to political purges. In addition to those who died in massacres, a large number of people died or became permanently disabled due to lynching or other forms of persecution. From 1968 to 1969, the Cleansing the Class Ranks purge caused the deaths of at least 500,000 people. Purges of similar nature such as the One Strike-Three Anti Campaign and the campaign towards the May Sixteenth elements were launched in the 1970s. For example, a political purge in Yunnan province, the Zhao Jianmin spy case, resulted in 17,000 deaths and wrongfully persecuted a total of 1.38 million people.

Repression of ethnic minorities

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The Panchen Lama during a struggle session
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Struggle session of Sampho Tsewang Rigzin and his wife

The Cultural Revolution wrought havoc on minority cultures and ethnicities. Languages and customs of ethnic minorities in China were labeled as part of the Four Olds, texts in ethnic languages were burned, and bilingual education was suppressed. In Inner Mongolia, some 790,000 people were persecuted during the Inner Mongolia incident. Of these, 22,900 were beaten to death, and 120,000 were maimed,: 258  during a witch hunt to find members of the alleged separatist New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In Xinjiang, copies of the Qur'an and other books of the Uyghur people were apparently burned. Muslim imams reportedly were paraded around with paint splashed on their bodies. In the ethnic Korean areas of northeast China, clashes took place.

In Yunnan Province, the palace of the Dai people's king was torched, and a massacre of Muslim Hui people at the hands of the PLA in Yunnan, known as the Shadian incident, reportedly claimed over 1,600 lives in 1975. After the Cultural Revolution, the government gave reparations for the Shadian Incident, including the erection of a Martyr's Memorial in Shadian.

Concessions to minorities were abolished during the Cultural Revolution as part of the Red Guards' attack on the "Four Olds". People's communes, previously only established in parts of Tibet, were established throughout Tibetan Autonomous Region in 1966, removing Tibet's exemption from China's land reform, and reimposed in other minority areas. The effect on Tibet was particularly severe as it came following the repression after the 1959 Tibetan uprising. The destruction of nearly all of its over 6,000 monasteries, which began before the Cultural Revolution, were often conducted with the complicity of local ethnic Tibetan Red Guards.: 9  Only eight were intact by the end of the 1970s.

Many monks and nuns were killed, and the general population was subjected to physical and psychological torture.: 9  An estimated 600,000 monks and nuns lived in Tibet in 1950, but by 1979, most were dead, imprisoned or had disappeared.: 22  The Tibetan government in exile claimed that many Tibetans died from famines in 1961–1964 and 1968–1973 as a result of forced collectivization, however, the number of Tibetan deaths or whether famines, in fact, took place in these periods is disputed. Despite persecution, some local leaders and minority ethnic practices survived in remote regions.

It was felt that pushing minority groups too hard would compromise China's border defenses. This was especially important as minorities make up a large percentage of the population that live in border regions. In the late 1960s, China experienced a period of strained relations with some of its neighbors, notably with the Soviet Union and India.

Rape and sexual abuse

Pan Suiming, Emily Honig, and others documented that rape and sexual abuse of sent-down women were common during the Cultural Revolution's height. Tania Branigan documented that women raped tended to be from educated urban backgrounds while their rapists were poor peasants or local officials.

Cultural impact and influence

Red Guards riot

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A 1968 map of Beijing showing streets and landmarks renamed during the Cultural Revolution. Andingmen Inner Street became "Great Leap Forward Road", Taijichang Street became the "Road for Eternal Revolution", Dongjiaominxiang was renamed "Anti-Imperialist Road", Beihai Park was renamed "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Park" and Jingshan Park became "Red Guard Park". Most of the Cultural Revolution-era name changes were later reversed.

The revolution aimed to destroy the Four Olds and establish the corresponding Four News, which ranged from changing of names and cutting of hair to ransacking homes, vandalizing cultural treasures, and desecrating temples.: 61–64 

The revolution aimed to eliminate cow demons and snake spirits - the class enemies who promoted bourgeois ideas, as well as those from an exploitative family background or who belonged to one of the Five Black Categories. Large numbers of people perceived to be "monsters and demons" regardless of guilt or innocence were publicly denounced, humiliated, and beaten. In their revolutionary fervor, students, especially the Red Guards, denounced their teachers, and children denounced their parents.: 59–61  Many died from ill-treatment or committed suicide. In 1968, youths were mobilized to go to the countryside in the Down to the Countryside Movement so they may learn from the peasantry, and the departure of millions from the cities helped end the most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution.: 176 

Academics and intellectuals

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Yao Tongbin, one of China's foremost missile scientists, was beaten to death by a mob in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution (1968). This caused Zhou Enlai to order special protection for key technical experts.

Academics and intellectuals were regarded as the "Stinking Old Ninth" and were widely persecuted. Many were sent to rural labor camps such as the May Seventh Cadre School. The prosecution of the Gang of Four revealed that 142,000 cadres and teachers in the education circles were persecuted. Academics, scientists, and educators who died included Xiong Qinglai, Jian Bozan, Wu Han, Rao Yutai, Wu Dingliang, Yao Tongbin and Zhao Jiuzhang. As of 1968, among the 171 senior members who worked at the headquarters of Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, 131 were persecuted. Among the members of the academy, 229 died. As of September 1971, more than 4,000 staff members of China's nuclear center in Qinghai had been persecuted, while more than 310 were disabled, over 40 committed suicide, and 5 were executed.

Despite the hardships, some significant achievements came in science and technology: scientists tested the first missile, created China's first hydrogen bomb and launched China's first satellite in the "Two Bombs, One Satellite" program.

Many health personnel were deployed to the countryside as barefoot doctors. Some farmers were given informal medical training, and health-care centers were established in rural communities. This process led to a marked improvement in health and life expectancy.

Education system

In the early months of Cultural Revolution, schools and universities were closed. Secondary school classes of 1966, 1967, and 1968 were unable to graduate on time later and became known as the "Old Three Cohort (老三届)".: 362  Colleges and universities were closed until 1970, and most universities did not reopen until 1972.: 164 University entrance exams were cancelled after 1966 (until the beginning of Boluan Fanzheng period in 1977), replaced by a system whereby students were recommended by factories, villages and military units. Traditional values were abandoned.: 195  On the other hand, industrial Universities were established in factories to supply technical and engineering programs for industrial workers, inspired by Mao's July 1968 remarks advocating vocational education.: 362  Factories around the country therefore established their own educational programs for technicians and engineers, and by 1976, there were 15,000 such 21 July Universities.: 92 

Meanwhile, in the initial stage of the Down to the Countryside Movement, most of the youth who took part volunteered. Later on, the government forced them to move. Between 1968 and 1979, 17 million urban youth left for the countryside. Living in the rural areas deprived them of higher education.: 10  This generation is sometimes referred to as the "lost generation". In the post-Mao period, many of those forcibly moved attacked the policy as a violation of their human rights.: 36  Formal literacy measurements did not resume until the 1980s. Some counties in Zhanjiang had literacy rates as low as 59% 20 years after the revolution. This was amplified by the elimination of qualified teachers—many districts were forced to rely on students to teach.

Primary and middle schools gradually reopened during the Cultural Revolution. Schooling years were reduced and education standard fell, but the proportion of Chinese children who completed primary education increased from less than half to almost all, and the fraction who completed junior middle school rose from 15% to over two-thirds. Educational opportunities for rural children expanded, while education of the urban elite were restricted by anti-elitist policies.: 166–167  Radical policies provided many in rural communities with middle school education for the first time.: 163  Rural infrastructure developed during this period, facilitated by the political changes that empowered ordinary rurals.: 177 

Slogans and rhetoric

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A Red Guard holding up the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, with "revolution is no crime, to rebel is justified" written on a flag next to him, 1967

Huang claimed that the Cultural Revolution had massive effects on Chinese society because of the extensive use of political slogans. He claimed that slogans played a central role in rallying Party leadership and citizens. For example, the slogan "to rebel is justified" (造反有理; zàofǎn yǒulǐ) affected many views.

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The remnants of a banner containing slogans from the Cultural Revolution in Anhui

Huang asserted that slogans were ubiquitous in people's lives, printed onto everyday items such as bus tickets, cigarette packets, and mirror tables.: 14  Workers were supposed to "grasp revolution and promote productions", while peasants were supposed to raise more pigs because "more pigs means more manure, and more manure means more grain." Even a casual remark by Mao, "Sweet potato tastes good; I like it" became a slogan.[page needed]

Political slogans had three sources: Mao, Party media such as People's Daily, and the Red Guards. Mao often offered vague, yet powerful directives that divided the Red Guards. These directives could be interpreted to suit personal interests, in turn aiding factions' goals in claiming loyalty to Mao. Red Guard slogans were violent, advancing themes such as "Strike the enemy down on the floor and step on him with a foot", "Long live the red terror!" and "Those who are against Chairman Mao will have their dog skulls smashed into pieces."[page needed]

Dittmer and Ruoxi claim that the Chinese language had historically been defined by subtlety, delicacy, moderation, and honesty, as well as the cultivation of a "refined and elegant literary style". This changed during the CR. These slogans were an effective method of "thought reform", mobilizing millions in a concerted attack upon the subjective world, "while at the same time reforming their objective world."[page needed]: 12 

Dittmer and Chen argued that the emphasis on politics made language into effective propaganda, but "also transformed it into a jargon of stereotypes—pompous, repetitive, and boring".: 12  To distance itself from the era, Deng's government cut back on political slogans. During a eulogy for Deng's death, Jiang Zemin called the Cultural Revolution a "grave mistake".

Arts and literature

In 1966, Jiang Qing advanced the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Black Line. Those perceived to be bourgeois, anti-socialist or anti-Mao (black line) should be cast aside, and called for the creation of new literature and arts.: 352–353  Disseminators of the "old culture" would be eradicated. The majority of writers and artists were seen as "black line figures" and "reactionary literati", and were persecuted, and subjected to "criticism and denunciation" where they could be humiliated and ravaged, and be imprisoned or sent to hard labour.: 213–214  For instance, Mei Zhi and her husband were sent to a tea farm in Lushan County, Sichuan. She did not resume writing until the 1980s.

In 1970, the CCP came to view the Ministry of Culture as so disruptive that it decided to dissolve the Ministry and establish a Culture Group within the State Council in an effort to rein in cultural politics.: 160  The principles for cultural production laid out by Mao in the 1942 "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Art and Literature" became dogmatized. The literary situation eased after 1972, as more were allowed to write, and many provincial literary periodicals resumed publication, but the majority of writers still could not work.: 219–20  Documents released in 1980 regarding the prosecution of the Gang of Four show that more than 2,600 people in the field of arts and literature were persecuted by the Ministry of Culture. Many died: the names of 200 writers and artists who were persecuted to death were commemorated in 1979. These include writers such as Lao She, Fu Lei, Deng Tuo, Baren, Li Guangtian, Yang Shuo and Zhao Shuli.: 213–14 

Opera and music

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The ballet The Red Detachment of Women, one of the Model Dramas promoted during the Cultural Revolution

Jiang took control of the stage and introduced revolutionary operas under her direct supervision. Traditional operas were banned as they were considered feudalistic and bourgeois, but revolutionary opera, which modified Peking opera in both content and form, was promoted.: 115  Six operas and two ballets were produced in the first three years, most notably the opera The Legend of the Red Lantern. These operas were the only approved opera form. Other opera troupes were required to adopt or change their repertoire.: 176 Loyalty dances became common and were performed throughout the country by both professional cultural workers and ordinary people.: 362  The model operas were broadcast on the radio, made into films, blared from public loudspeakers, taught to students in schools and workers in factories, and became ubiquitous as a form of popular entertainment and were the only theatrical entertainment for millions.: 352–53 : 115  Most model dramas featured women as their leads and promoted Chinese state feminism. Their narratives begin with them oppressed by misogyny, class position, and imperialism before liberating themselves through the discovery of internal strength and the CCP.

During the Cultural Revolution, composers of Yellow Music, which had already been banned following the communist revolution, were persecuted, including Li Jinhui who was killed in 1967. Revolution-themed songs instead were promoted, and songs such as "Ode to the Motherland", "Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman", "The East Is Red" and "Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China" were either written or became popular during this period. "The East Is Red", especially, became popular; it de facto supplanted "March of the Volunteers" (lyrics author Tian Han persecuted to death) as the national anthem of China, though the latter was later restored to its previous place. Moreover, "quotation songs", in which Mao's quotations were set to music, were particularly popular during the early years of the Cultural Revolution.: 34  Records of quotation songs were played over loudspeakers, their primary distribution,: 35  as the use of transistor radios lagged until 1976.: 32–33  "Rusticated youths" with an interest in broadcast technology frequently operated rural radio stations after 1968.: 42 

Visual arts

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Posters from the Cultural Revolution period

Traditional themes were sidelined and artists such as Feng Zikai, Shi Lu, and Pan Tianshou were persecuted.: 97  Many of the artists were assigned to manual labour, and artists were expected to depict subjects that glorified the Cultural Revolution related to their labour.: 351–52  In 1971, in part to alleviate their suffering, several leading artists were recalled from manual labour or freed from captivity under a Zhou initiative to decorate hotels and railway stations defaced by Red Guard slogans. Zhou said that the artworks were meant for foreigners, therefore were "outer" art and not under the obligations and restrictions placed on "inner" art meant for Chinese citizens. He claimed that landscape paintings should not be considered one of the "Four Olds". However, Zhou was weakened by cancer, and in 1974, the Jiang faction seized these and other paintings and mounted exhibitions in Beijing, Shanghai and other cities denouncing the artworks as "Black Paintings".: 368–376 

Propaganda in posters was used as a mass communication device and often served as the people's leading source of information. They were produced in large numbers and widely disseminated, and were used by the government and Red Guards to push ideology defined by the Party. The two main posters genres were the big-character poster or dazibao and commercial propaganda poster.: 7–12 

  • The dazibao presented slogans, poems, commentary and graphics often posted on walls in public spaces, factories and communes. Mao wrote his own dazibao at Beijing University on 5 August 1966, calling on the people to "Bombard the Headquarters".: 5 
  • Xuanchuanhua, or propaganda paintings, were artworks produced by the government and sold cheaply in stores to be displayed in homes or workplaces. The artists for these posters might be amateurs or uncredited professionals, and the posters were largely in a Socialist Realist visual style with specific conventions—for example, images of Mao were to be depicted as "red, smooth, and luminescent".: 7–12 : 360 

Some scholar also argued that, before this period, relatively few cultural productions reflected the lives of peasants and workers, and during the revolution, the struggles of workers, peasants, and revolutionary soldiers became frequent artistic subjects, often created by peasants and workers themselves. The spread of peasant paintings in rural China, for example, became one of the "newborn things" celebrated in a socialist society.

Film

The Four Hundred Films to be Criticized booklet was distributed, and film directors and actors/actresses were criticized with some tortured and imprisoned.: 401–02  These included many of Jiang Qing's rivals and former friends. Those who died in the period included Cai Chusheng, Zheng Junli, Shangguan Yunzhu, Wang Ying, and Xu Lai. No feature films were produced in mainland China for seven years apart from a few approved "Model dramas" and highly ideological films. A notable example is Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy. China rejected Hollywood films and most foreign films.: 213 Albanian films and North Korean films developed mass audiences in China.: 213  In 1972, Chinese officials invited Michelangelo Antonioni to China to film the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. Antonioni made the documentary Chung Kuo, Cina. When it was released in 1974, CCP leadership in China interpreted the film as reactionary and anti-Chinese. Viewing art through the principles of the Yan'an Talks, particularly the concept that there is no such thing as art-for-art's-sake, party leadership construed Antonioni's aesthetic choices as politically motivated and banned the film.: 13–14 

Mobile film units brought Chinese cinema to the countryside and were crucial to the standardization and popularization of culture during this period, particularly including revolutionary model operas.: 30  During the Cultural Revolution's early years, mobile film teams traveled to rural areas with news reels of Mao meeting with Red Guards and Tiananmen Square parades, which became known as "red treasure films".: 110  The release of the filmed versions of the revolutionary model operas resulted in a re-organization and expansion of China's film exhibition network.: 73  From 1965 to 1976, the number of film projection units in China quadrupled, total film audiences nearly tripled, and the national film attendance rate doubled.: 133  The Cultural Revolution Group drastically reduced ticket prices which, in its view, would allow film to better serve the needs of workers and of socialism.: 133 

Historical sites

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Buddhist statues defaced during the Cultural Revolution

China's historical sites, artifacts and archives suffered devastating damage, as they were thought to be at the root of "old ways of thinking". Artifacts were seized, museums and private homes ransacked, and any item found that was thought to represent bourgeois or feudal ideas was destroyed. Few records relate how much was destroyed—Western observers suggest that much of China's thousands of years of history was in effect destroyed, or, later, smuggled abroad for sale. Chinese historians compare the suppression to Qin Shi Huang's great Confucian purge. Religious persecution intensified during this period, as religion was viewed in opposition to Marxist–Leninist and Maoist thinking.: 73 

The destruction of historical relics was never formally sanctioned by the Party, whose official policy was instead to protect such items. On 14 May 1967, the Central Committee issued Several suggestions for the protection of cultural relics and books during the Cultural Revolution.: 21  Despite this, enormous damage was inflicted on China's cultural heritage. For example, a survey in 1972 in Beijing of 18 cultural heritage sites, including the Temple of Heaven and Ming Tombs, showed extensive damage. Of the 80 cultural heritage sites in Beijing under municipal protection, 30 were destroyed, and of the 6,843 cultural sites under protection by Beijing government decision in 1958, 4,922 were damaged or destroyed. Numerous valuable old books, paintings, and other cultural relics were burnt.: 98 

Later archaeological excavation and preservation after the destructive period were protected, and several significant discoveries, such as the Terracotta Army and the Mawangdui, occurred after the peak of the Revolution.: 21  Nevertheless, the most prominent medium of academic research in archaeology, the journal Kaogu, did not publish. After the most violent phase, the attack on traditional culture continued in 1973 with the Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Campaign as part of the struggle against moderate Party elements.

Media

During the early period of the Cultural Revolution, freedom of the press in China was at its peak. While the number of newspapers declined in this period, the number of independent publications by mass political organizations grew. According to China's National Bureau of Statistics, the number of newspapers dropped from 343 in 1965, to 49 in 1966, and then to a 20th-century low of 43 in 1967. At the same time, the number of publications by mass organizations such as Red Guards grew to an estimated number as high as 10,000.

Independent political groups could publish broadsheets and handbills, as well as leaders' speeches and meeting transcripts which would normally have been considered highly classified.: 24  From 1966 to 1969, at least 5,000 new broadsheets by independent political groups were published.: 60  Several Red Guard organizations also operated independent printing presses to publish newspapers, articles, speeches, and big-character posters. For example, the largest student organization in Shanghai, the Red Revolutionaries, established a newspaper that had a print run of 800,000 copies by the end of 1966.: 58–59 

Foreign relations

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The Embassy of China, Jakarta after being burned

The functions of China's embassies abroad were disrupted during the early part of the Cultural Revolution. In a 22 March 1969 meeting on the Sino-Soviet border clashes, Mao stated that in foreign relations, China was "now isolated" and "we need to relax a little".: 287  Later that year, China began to restore its embassies to normal functioning.: 287 

However, the Sino-Soviet conflict culminated in 1969, and according to declassified documents from both China and the United States, the Soviet Union planned to launch a large-scale nuclear strike on China after the Zhenbao Island incident in 1969. The planned targets include Beijing, Changchun, Anshan and China's missile-launch centers of Jiuquan, Xichang and Lop Nur. This crisis almost led to a major nuclear war, seven years after the Cuban missile crisis. Eventually, the Soviet called off the attack due to the intervention from the United States.

China exported communist revolutions as well as communist ideologies to multiple countries in Southeast Asia, supporting parties in Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and in particular, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (responsible for the Cambodian genocide). It is estimated that at least 90% of the Khmer Rouge's foreign aid came from China. In 1975 alone at least US$1 billion in interest-free economic and military aid and US$20 million came from China. China's economic malaise impacted China's ability to assist North Vietnam in its war against South Vietnam by the 1970s, which cooled relations between the once allied nations.

Evaluations

On 27 June 1981, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party adopted the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, an official assessment of major historical events since 1949. The Resolution declared that the Cultural Revolution was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the people, the country, and the party since the founding of the People's Republic."

After the Cultural Revolution, a massive social and cultural movement known as the "New Enlightenment" took place in mainland China since the late 1970s. The movement lasted throughout the 1980s, and opposed the ideology of Cultural Revolution and feudalism. The New Enlightenment movement ended due to the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre in June 1989. After Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in early 1992, however, intellectuals in mainland China became divided and formed two major schools of thought, the Liberalism and the New Left, which held different views on the Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile Maoist scholars hold another view.[citation needed]

To this day, public discussion of the Cultural Revolution is still limited within mainland China. The Chinese government continues to prohibit news organizations from mentioning details, and online discussions and books about the topic are subject to official scrutiny. Textbooks abide by the "official view" of the events. Many government documents from the 1960s onward remain classified. Despite inroads by prominent sinologists, independent scholarly research is discouraged.

Mao Zedong's legacy remains in some dispute. During the anniversary of his birth, many people viewed Mao as a godlike figure and referred to him as "the people's great savior". Contemporary discussions in the CCP-owned tabloid Global Times continue to glorify Mao. Rather than focus on consequences, state media newspapers claim that revolutions typically have a brutal side and are unable to be viewed from the "humanitarian perspective". Critics of Mao Zedong look at the actions that occurred under his leadership from the point of view that "he was better at conquering power than at ruling the country and developing a socialist economy". Mao went to extreme measures on his path to power, costing millions of lives then and during his rule.

See also

  • History of the Chinese Communist Party
  • History of the People's Republic of China
  • List of campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party
  • Maoism
  • Marxism–Leninism–Maoism
  • Marxist cultural analysis

Notes

  1. This position, effectively China's de jure head of state, was renamed "President" in 1982.
  2. Some claim 1.877 million.[why?]

References

Citations

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The Cultural Revolution formally known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a sociopolitical movement in the People s Republic of China PRC It was launched by Mao Zedong in 1966 and lasted until 1976 Its publicly stated goal was to preserve Chinese socialism by purging remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society Cultural RevolutionPropaganda poster depicting Mao Zedong above a group of soldiers from the People s Liberation Army The caption reads The Chinese People s Liberation Army is the great school of Mao Zedong Thought Duration16 May 1966 6 October 1976 1966 05 16 1976 10 06 10 years and 143 days LocationChinaMotivePreservation of communism by purging capitalist and traditional elements and power struggle between Maoists and pragmatists Organized byChinese Communist Party PolitburoOutcomeEconomic activity impaired historical and cultural material destroyed DeathsEstimates vary from hundreds of thousands to millions see Death toll Property damageCemetery of Confucius Temple of Heaven Ming tombsArrestsJiang Qing Zhang Chunqiao Yao Wenyuan and Wang HongwenCultural RevolutionChinese文化大革命Literal meaning Great Cultural Revolution TranscriptionsStandard MandarinHanyu PinyinWenhua dagemingBopomofoㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋGwoyeu RomatzyhWenhuah dahgerminqWade GilesWen2 hua4 ta4 ko2 ming4Tongyong PinyinWun hua da ge mingIPA we n xwa ta kɤ mi ŋ WuRomanizationVen平ho去 du去 keh入min去HakkaPha k fa sṳVun fa thai kiet minYue CantoneseYale RomanizationMahn faa daaih gaak mihngJyutpingman4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6IPA mɐn fa taj kak mɪŋ Southern MinHokkien POJBun hoa tai kek bengEastern MinFuzhou BUCUng hua dai gaik mengFormal nameSimplified Chinese无产阶级文化大革命Traditional Chinese無產階級文化大革命Literal meaning Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution TranscriptionsStandard MandarinHanyu PinyinWuchǎnjieji wenhua dagemingBopomofoㄨˊ ㄔㄢˇ ㄐㄧㄝ ㄐㄧˊ ㄨㄣˊ ㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋWade GilesWu2 ch ʻan2 chieh1 chi2 wen2 hua4 ta4 ko2 ming4Tongyong PinyinWu chǎn jie ji wun hua da ge mingIPA u ʈʂʰa n tɕje tɕi we n xwa ta kɤ mi ŋ WuRomanizationVu平tshae上cia平cih入 ven平ho去 du去 keh入min去HakkaPha k fa sṳVu san kie kip vun fa thai kiet minYue CantoneseJyutpingmou4 caan2 gaai1 kap1 man4 faa3 daai6 gaak3 ming6IPA mɔw tsʰan kaj kʰɐp mɐn fa taj kak mɪŋ Southern MinHokkien POJBu san kai kip bun hoa tōa kek bengEastern MinFuzhou BUCU sang găi ngek ung hua dai gaik meng In May 1966 with the help of the Cultural Revolution Group Mao launched the Revolution and said that bourgeois elements had infiltrated the government and society with the aim of restoring capitalism Mao called on young people to bombard the headquarters and proclaimed that to rebel is justified Mass upheaval began in Beijing with Red August in 1966 Many young people mainly students responded by forming cadres of Red Guards throughout the country Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse tung became revered within his cult of personality In 1967 emboldened radicals began seizing power from local governments and party branches establishing new revolutionary committees in their place while smashing public security procuratorate and judicial systems These committees often split into rival factions precipitating armed clashes among the radicals After the fall of Lin Biao in 1971 the Gang of Four became influential in 1972 and the Revolution continued until Mao s death in 1976 soon followed by the arrest of the Gang of Four The Cultural Revolution was characterized by violence and chaos across Chinese society Estimates of the death toll vary widely typically ranging from 1 2 million including a massacre in Guangxi that included acts of cannibalism as well as massacres in Beijing Inner Mongolia Guangdong Yunnan Hunan and so on Red Guards sought to destroy the Four Olds old ideas old culture old customs and old habits which often took the form of destroying historical artifacts cultural and religious sites Tens of millions were persecuted including senior officials such as Liu Shaoqi Deng Xiaoping and Peng Dehuai millions were persecuted for being members of the Five Black Categories with intellectuals and scientists labelled as the Stinking Old Ninth The country s schools and universities were closed and the National College Entrance Examination were cancelled Over 10 million youth from urban areas were relocated under the Down to the Countryside Movement In December 1978 Deng Xiaoping became the new paramount leader of China replacing Mao s successor Hua Guofeng Deng and his allies introduced the Boluan Fanzheng program and initiated reforms and opening of China which together with the New Enlightenment movement gradually dismantled the ideology of Cultural Revolution In 1981 the Communist Party publicly acknowledged numerous failures of the Cultural Revolution declaring it responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the people the country and the party since the founding of the People s Republic Given its broad scope and social impact memories and perspectives of the Cultural Revolution are varied and complex in contemporary China It is often referred to as the ten years of chaos 十年动乱 shi nian dongluan or ten years of havoc 十年浩劫 shi nian haojie EtymologyThe terminology of cultural revolution appeared in communist party discourses and newspapers prior to the founding of the People s Republic of China During this period the term was used interchangeably with cultural construction and referred to eliminating illiteracy in order to widen public participation in civic matters This usage of cultural revolution continued through the 1950s and into the 1960s and often involved drawing parallels to the May Fourth Movement or the Soviet cultural revolution of 1928 1931 56 BackgroundCreation of the People s Republic On 1 October 1949 Mao Zedong declared the People s Republic of China symbolically bringing the decades long Chinese Civil War to a close Remaining Republican forces fled to Taiwan and continued to resist the People s Republic in various ways Many soldiers of the Chinese Republicans were left in mainland China and Mao Zedong launched the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries to eliminate these soldiers left behind as well as elements of Chinese society viewed as potentially dangerous to Mao s new government Great Leap Forward The Great Leap Forward similar to the Five year plans of the Soviet Union was Mao Zedong s proposal to make the newly created People s Republic of China an industrial superpower Beginning in 1958 the Great Leap Forward did produce at least on the surface incredible industrialization but also caused the Great Chinese Famine while still falling short of projected goals In early 1962 at CCP s Seven Thousand Cadres Conference Mao made self criticism after which he took a semi retired role leaving future responsibilities to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping This section is an excerpt from Great Leap Forward edit Rural workers smelting iron during the nighttime in 1958 The Great Leap Forward stemmed from multiple factors including the purge of intellectuals the surge of less educated radicals the need to find new ways to generate domestic capital rising enthusiasm about the potential results mass mobilization might produce and reaction against the sociopolitical results of the Soviet s development strategy 6 Mao ambitiously sought an increase in rural grain production and an increase in industrial activity Mao was dismissive of technical experts and basic economic principles which meant that industrialization of the countryside would solely be dependent on the peasants Grain quotas were introduced with the idea of having peasants provide grains for themselves and support urban areas Output from the industrial activities such as steel was also supposed to be used for urban growth 6 Local officials were fearful of the so called Anti Right Deviation Struggle and they competed to fulfill or over fulfill quotas which were based on Mao s exaggerated claims collecting non existent surpluses and leaving farmers to starve to death Higher officials did not dare to report the economic disaster which was being caused by these policies and national officials blaming bad weather for the decline in food output took little or no action Impact of international tensions and anti revisionism In the early 1950s the PRC and the Soviet Union USSR were the world s two largest communist states Although initially they were mutually supportive disagreements arose after Nikita Khrushchev took power in the USSR In 1956 Khrushchev denounced his predecessor Josef Stalin and his policies and began implementing economic reforms Mao and many other CCP members opposed these changes believing that they would damage the worldwide communist movement 4 7 Mao believed that Khrushchev was a revisionist altering Marxist Leninist concepts which Mao claimed would give capitalists control of the USSR Relations soured The USSR refused to support China s case for joining the United Nations and reneged on its pledge to supply China with a nuclear weapon 4 7 Mao denounced revisionism in April 1960 Without pointing at the USSR Mao criticized its Balkan ally the League of Communists of Yugoslavia In turn the USSR criticized China s Balkan ally the Party of Labour of Albania In 1963 CCP began to denounce the USSR publishing nine polemics 7 Other Soviet actions increased concerns about potential fifth columnists As a result of the tensions following the Sino Soviet split Soviet leaders authorized radio broadcasts into China stating that the Soviet Union would assist genuine communists who overthrew Mao and his erroneous course 141 Chinese leadership also feared the increasing military conflict between the United States and North Vietnam concerned that China s support would lead to the United States to seek out potential Chinese assets 141 Socialist Education Movement and Hai Rui Dismissed from Office The purge of General Luo Ruiqing solidified the PLA s loyalty to Mao In 1963 Mao launched the Socialist Education Movement Mao set the scene by cleansing powerful Beijing officials of questionable loyalty His approach was executed via newspaper articles internal meetings and by his network of political allies In late 1959 historian and deputy mayor of Beijing Wu Han published a historical drama entitled Hai Rui Dismissed from Office In the play an honest civil servant Hai Rui is dismissed by a corrupt emperor While Mao initially praised the play in February 1965 he secretly commissioned Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan to publish an article criticizing it Yao described the play as an allegory attacking Mao flagging Mao as the emperor and Peng Dehuai who had previously questioned Mao during the Lushan Conference as the honest civil servant 15 18 Yao s article put Beijing mayor Peng Zhen on the defensive Peng Wu Han s direct superior was the head of the Five Man Group a committee commissioned by Mao to study the potential for a cultural revolution Peng Zhen aware that he would be implicated if Wu indeed wrote an anti Mao play wished to contain Yao s influence Yao s article was initially published only in select local newspapers Peng forbade its publication in the nationally distributed People s Daily and other major newspapers under his control and not pay heed to Yao s petty politics 14 19 While the literary battle against Peng raged Mao fired Yang Shangkun director of the party s General Office an organ that controlled internal communications making unsubstantiated charges He installed loyalist Wang Dongxing head of Mao s security detail Yang s dismissal likely emboldened Mao s allies to move against their factional rivals 14 19 On 12 February 1966 the Five Man Group issued a report known as the February Outline The Outline as sanctioned by the party center defined Hai Rui as a constructive academic discussion and aimed to distance Peng Zhen formally from any political implications However Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan continued their denunciations Meanwhile Mao sacked Propaganda Department director Lu Dingyi a Peng ally 20 27 Lu s removal gave Maoists unrestricted access to the press Mao delivered his final blow to Peng at a high profile Politburo meeting through loyalists Kang Sheng and Chen Boda They accused Peng of opposing Mao labeled the February Outline evidence of Peng Zhen s revisionism and grouped him with three other disgraced officials as part of the Peng Luo Lu Yang Anti Party Clique 20 27 On 16 May the Politburo formalized the decisions by releasing an official document condemning Peng and his anti party allies in the strongest terms disbanding his Five Man Group and replacing it with the Maoist Cultural Revolution Group CRG 27 35 1966 OutbreakThe Cultural Revolution can be divided into two main periods spring 1966 to summer 1968 when most of the key events took place a tailing period that lasted until fall 1976 The early phase was characterized by mass movement and political pluralization Virtually anyone could create a political organization even without party approval Known as Red Guards these organizations originally arose in schools and universities and later in factories and other institutions After 1968 most of these organizations ceased to exist although their legacies were a topic of controversy later Notification The 16 May Notification In May 1966 an expanded session of the Politburo was called in Beijing The conference was laden with Maoist political rhetoric on class struggle and filled with meticulously prepared indictments of recently ousted leaders such as Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing One of these documents distributed on 16 May was prepared with Mao s personal supervision and was particularly damning 39 40 Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party the government the army and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter revolutionary revisionists Once conditions are ripe they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie Some of them we have already seen through others we have not Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors persons like Khrushchev for example who are still nestling beside us 47 Later known as the 16 May Notification this document summarized Mao s ideological justification for CR 40 Initially kept secret distributed only among high ranking party members it was later declassified and published in People s Daily on 17 May 1967 41 Effectively it implied that enemies of the Communist cause could be found within the Party class enemies who wave the red flag to oppose the red flag The only way to identify these people was through the telescope and microscope of Mao Zedong Thought 46 While the party leadership was relatively united in approving Mao s agenda many Politburo members were not enthusiastic or simply confused about the direction 13 The charges against party leaders such as Peng disturbed China s intellectual community and the eight non Communist parties 41 Mass rallies May June Sweep Away All Cow Demons and Snake Spirits an editorial published on the front page of People s Daily on 1 June 1966 calling for the proletariat to completely eradicate the Four Olds that have poisoned the people of China for thousands of years fostered by the exploiting classes 50 After the purge of Peng Zhen the Beijing Party Committee effectively ceased to function paving the way for disorder in the capital On 25 May under the guidance of zh wife of Mao loyalist Kang Sheng Nie Yuanzi a philosophy lecturer at Peking University authored a big character poster along with other leftists and posted it to a public bulletin Nie attacked the university s party administration and its leader Lu Ping Nie insinuated that the university leadership much like Peng were trying to contain revolutionary fervor in a sinister attempt to oppose the party and advance revisionism 56 58 Mao promptly endorsed Nie s poster as the first Marxist big character poster in China Approved by Mao the poster rippled across educational institutions Students began to revolt against their school s party establishments Classes were cancelled in Beijing primary and secondary schools followed by a decision on 13 June to expand the class suspension nationwide By early June throngs of young demonstrators lined the capital s major thoroughfares holding giant portraits of Mao beating drums and shouting slogans 59 61 When the dismissal of Peng and the municipal party leadership became public in early June confusion was widespread The public and foreign missions were kept in the dark on the reason for Peng s ousting Top Party leadership was caught off guard by the sudden protest wave and struggled with how to respond After seeking Mao s guidance in Hangzhou Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping decided to send in work teams effectively ideological guidance squads of cadres to the city s schools and People s Daily to restore some semblance of order and re establish party control 62 64 The work teams had a poor understanding of student sentiment Unlike the political movement of the 1950s that squarely targeted intellectuals the new movement was focused on established party cadres many of whom were part of the work teams As a result the work teams came under increasing suspicion as thwarting revolutionary fervor 71 Party leadership subsequently became divided over whether or not work teams should continue Liu Shaoqi insisted on continuing work team involvement and suppressing the movement s most radical elements fearing that the movement would spin out of control 75 Bombard the Headquarters July Mao Liu conflictIn 1966 Mao broke with Liu Shaoqi right then serving as President over the work teams issue Mao s polemic Bombard the Headquarters was widely recognized as targeting Liu the purported bourgeois party headquarters Mao waves to the crowd on the banks of the Yangtze before his swim across July 1966 In July Mao in Wuhan crossed the Yangtze River showing his vigor He then returned from Wuhan to Beijing and criticized party leadership for its handling of the work teams issue Mao accused the work teams of undermining the student movement calling for their full withdrawal on 24 July Several days later a rally was held at the Great Hall of the People to announce the decision and reveal the tone of the movement to teachers and students At the rally Party leaders encouraged the masses to not be afraid and take charge of the movement free of Party interference 81 84 The work teams issue marked a decisive defeat for Liu it also signaled that disagreement over how to handle the CR s unfolding events would irreversibly split Mao from the party leadership On 1 August the Eleventh Plenum of the 8th Central Committee was convened to advance Mao s radical agenda At the plenum Mao showed disdain for Liu repeatedly interrupting him as he delivered his opening day speech 94 Red Guards in BeijingFrom left 1 Students at Beijing Normal University making big character posters denouncing Liu Shaoqi 2 Big characters posted at Peking University 3 Students at No 23 Middle School in Beijing reading People s Daily during the Resume Classes campaign On 28 July Red Guard representatives wrote to Mao calling for rebellion and upheaval to safeguard the revolution Mao then responded to the letters by writing his own big character poster entitled Bombard the Headquarters rallying people to target the command centre i e Headquarters of counterrevolution Mao wrote that despite having undergone a communist revolution a bourgeois elite was still thriving in positions of authority in the government and Party This statement has been interpreted as a direct indictment of the party establishment under Liu and Deng the purported bourgeois headquarters of China The personnel changes at the Plenum reflected a radical re design of the party hierarchy Liu and Deng kept their seats on the Politburo Standing Committee but were sidelined from day to day party affairs Lin Biao was elevated to become the CCP s number two Liu s rank went from second to eighth and was no longer Mao s heir apparent A struggle session targeting Liu Shaoqi s wife Wang Guangmei Along with the top leadership losing power the entire national Party bureaucracy was purged The extensive Organization Department in charge of party personnel virtually ceased to exist The top officials in the Propaganda Department were sacked with many of its functions folded into the CRG 96 Red August and the Sixteen Points Mao and Lin Biao surrounded by rallying Red Guards in Beijing December 1966 Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse tung led the Red Guards to commit to their objective as China s future 107 By December 1967 350 million copies had been printed 61 64 During the Red August of Beijing on 8 August 1966 the party s General Committee passed its Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution later to be known as the Sixteen Points This decision defined the Cultural Revolution as a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country 92 93 Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown it is still trying to use the old ideas culture customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses capture their minds and endeavour to stage a comeback The proletariat must do the exact opposite it must meet head on every challenge of the bourgeoisie to change the mental outlook of the whole of society At present our objective is to struggle against and overthrow those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic authorities and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system The implications of the Sixteen Points were far reaching It elevated what was previously a student movement to a nationwide mass campaign that would galvanize workers farmers soldiers and lower level party functionaries to rise challenge authority and re shape the superstructure of society Tiananmen Square on 15 September 1966 the occasion of Chairman Mao s third of eight mass rallies with Red Guards in 1966 On 18 August in Beijing over a million Red Guards from across the country gathered in and around Tiananmen Square for an audience with the chairman 106 107 Mao mingled with Red Guards and encouraged them donning a Red Guard armband Lin also took centre stage denouncing perceived enemies in society that were impeding the progress of the revolution 66 Subsequently violence escalated in Beijing and quickly spread xvi The 18 August rally was filmed and shown to approximately 100 million people in its first month of release 53 On 22 August a central directive was issued to prevent police intervention in Red Guard activities and those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled counter revolutionaries Central officials lifted restraints on violent behavior Xie Fuzhi the national police chief often pardoned Red Guards for their crimes 124 126 The campaign included incidents of torture murder and public humiliation Many people who were indicted as counter revolutionaries died by suicide During Red August 1 772 people were murdered in Beijing many of the victims were teachers who were attacked or killed by their own students In September Shanghai experienced 704 suicides and 534 deaths in Wuhan 62 suicides and 32 murders occurred during the same period 124 Peng Dehuai was brought to Beijing to be publicly ridiculed Destruction of the Four Olds August November The remains of Wanli Emperor at the Ming tombs Red Guards dragged the remains of the Wanli Emperor and Empresses to the front of the tomb where they were posthumously denounced and burned Between August and November 1966 eight mass rallies were held drawing in 12 million people most of whom were Red Guards 106 The government bore the travel expenses of Red Guards 110 At the rallies Lin called for the destruction of the Four Olds namely old customs culture habits and ideas 66 146 Some changes associated with the Four Olds campaign were mainly benign such as assigning new names to city streets places and even people millions of babies were born with revolutionary names Other aspects were more destructive particularly in the realms of culture and religion Historical sites throughout the country were destroyed The damage was particularly pronounced in the capital Beijing Red Guards laid siege to the Temple of Confucius in Qufu 119 and other historically significant tombs and artifacts Libraries of historical and foreign texts were destroyed books were burned Temples churches mosques monasteries and cemeteries were closed and sometimes converted to other uses or looted and destroyed Marxist propaganda depicted Buddhism as superstition and religion was looked upon as a means of hostile foreign infiltration as well as an instrument of the ruling class Clergy were arrested and sent to camps many Tibetan Buddhists were forced to participate in the destruction of their monasteries at gunpoint The cemetery of Confucius was attacked by Red Guards in November 1966 This statue of the Yongle Emperor was originally carved in stone and was destroyed in the Cultural Revolution A metal replica is in its place The remains of the 8th century Buddhist monk Huineng were attacked during the Cultural Revolution A frieze damaged during the Cultural Revolution originally from a garden house of a rich imperial official in Suzhou Central Work Conference October In October 1966 Mao convened a Central Work Conference mostly to enlist party leaders who had not yet adopted the latest ideology Liu and Deng were prosecuted and begrudgingly offered self criticism 137 After the conference Liu once a powerful moderate pundit was placed under house arrest then sent to a detention camp where he was denied medical treatment and died in 1969 Deng was sent away for a period of re education three times and was eventually sent to work in an engine factory in Jiangxi Rebellion by party cadres accelerated after the conference End of the year On 5 October the Central Military Commission and the PLA s Department of General Political Tasks directed military academies to dismiss their classes to allow cadets to become more involved in the Cultural Revolution 147 In doing so they were acting on Lin Biao s 23 August 1966 for three month turmoil in the PLA 147 In Macau rioting broke out during the 12 3 incident 84 The event was prompted by the colonial government s delays in approving a new wing for a CCP elementary school in Taipa 84 The school board illegally began construction but the colonial government sent police to stop the workers Several people were injured in the resulting melee On December 3 1966 two days of rioting occurred in which hundreds were injured and six to eight were killed leading to a total clampdown by the Portuguese government The event set in motion Portugal s de facto abdication of control over Macau putting Macau on the path to eventual absorption by China 84 85 By the beginning of 1967 a wide variety of grassroots political organizations had formed Beyond Red Guard and student rebel groups these included poor peasant associations workers pickets and Mao Zedong Thought study societies among others Communist Party leaders encouraged these groups to join up and these groups joined various coalitions and held various cross group congresses and assemblies 60 1967 Seizure of powerMass organizations coalesced into two factions the radicals who backed Mao s purge of the Communist party and the conservatives who backed the moderate party establishment The support the left policy was established in January 1967 Mao s policy was to support the rebels in seizing power it required the PLA to support the broad masses of the revolutionary leftists in their struggle to seize power In March 1967 the policy was adapted into the Three Supports and Two Militaries initiative in which PLA troops were sent to schools and work units across the country to stabilize political tumult and end factional warfare 345 The three Supports were to support the left support the interior support industry The two Militaries referred to military management and military training 345 The policy of supporting the left failed to define leftists at a time when almost all mass organizations claimed to be leftist or revolutionary PLA commanders had developed close working relations with the party establishment leading many military units to repress radicals Spurred by the events in Beijing power seizure groups formed across the country and began expanding into factories and the countryside In Shanghai a young factory worker named Wang Hongwen organized a far reaching revolutionary coalition one that displaced existing Red Guard groups On 3 January 1967 with support from CRG heavyweights Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan the group of firebrand activists overthrew the Shanghai municipal government under Chen Pixian in what became known as the January Storm and formed in its place the Shanghai People s Commune 115 Mao then expressed his approval Rebel factions of Red Guards marching in Shanghai 1967 Shanghai s was the first provincial level government overthrown Provincial governments and many parts of the state and party bureaucracy were affected with power seizures taking place In the next three weeks 24 more province level governments were overthrown Revolutionary committees were subsequently established in place of local governments and branches of the Communist Party For example in Beijing three separate revolutionary groups declared power seizures on the same day In Heilongjiang local party secretary Pan Fusheng seized power from the party organization under his own leadership Some leaders even wrote the CRG asking to be overthrown 170 72 In Beijing Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao targeted Vice Premier Tao Zhu The power seizure movement was appearing in the military as well In February prominent generals Ye Jianying and Chen Yi as well as Vice Premier Tan Zhenlin vocally asserted their opposition to the more extreme aspects of the movement with some party elders insinuating that the CRG s real motives were to remove the revolutionary old guard Mao initially ambivalent took to the Politburo floor on 18 February to denounce the opposition directly endorsing the radicals activities This resistance was branded the February Countercurrent 195 196 effectively silencing critics within the party 207 209 Red Guards marching in Guizhou 1967 The banner in the center reads The People s Liberation Army firmly supports the proletarian revolutionary faction Although in early 1967 popular insurgencies were limited outside of the biggest cities local governments began collapsing all across China 21 Revolutionaries dismantled ruling government and party organizations because power seizures lacked centralized leadership it was no longer clear who believed in Mao s revolutionary vision and who was exploiting the chaos for their own gain The formation of rival revolutionary groups and manifestations of long established local feuds led to violent struggles between factions Tension grew between mass organizations and the military In response Lin Biao issued a directive for the army to aid the radicals At the same time the army took control of some provinces and locales that were deemed incapable of handling the power transition 219 221 In Wuhan as in many other cities two major revolutionary organizations emerged one supporting and one attacking the conservative establishment Chen Zaidao the Army general in charge of the area forcibly repressed the anti establishment demonstrators Mao flew to Wuhan with a large entourage of central officials in an attempt to secure military loyalty in the area On 20 July 1967 local agitators in response kidnapped Mao s emissary Wang Li in what became known as the Wuhan Incident Subsequently Chen was sent to Beijing and tried by Jiang Qing and the rest of the CRG Chen s resistance was the last major open display of opposition within the PLA 214 The Gang of Four s Zhang Chunqiao admitted that the most crucial factor in the Cultural Revolution was not the Red Guards or the CRG or the rebel worker organisations but the PLA When the PLA local garrison supported Mao s radicals they were able to take over the local government successfully but if they were not cooperative the takeovers were unsuccessful 175 Violent clashes occurred in virtually all major cities In response to the Wuhan Incident Mao and Jiang began establishing a workers armed self defense force a revolutionary armed force of mass character to counter what he saw as rightism in 75 of the PLA officer corps Meanwhile a massive movement to smash gong jian fa or to smash the Police the Procuratorate and the Court was carried out in mainland China The few remaining going jian fa organizations were later placed under military control WuzhongZhengzhouKaifengShanghaiLianyuanChongqingGuangzhouclass notpageimage Some locations of armed conflict between rebel factions during the summer of 1967 In Chongqing an arms manufacturing center during August 1967 battles involved close to 10 000 combatants killed or wounded close to 1 000 and created 180 000 refugees in Chengdu alone Chaotianmen harbor district was destroyed in a battle involving tanks mobile artillery and anti aircraft guns In Wuzhong Ningxia on 28 August 1967 Kang Sheng gave orders allowing the PLA to fire on opposing Hui Muslim factions killing approximately 100 people and wounding 133 In Zhengzhou and Kaifeng factory clashes killed 37 wounded 290 and led to 300 prisoners of war two of whom were buried alive At Shanghai Diesel Engine Plant a battle in which Wang Hongwen led the victorious faction killed 18 and wounded 983 In Lianyuan fighting during July and August 1967 killed six and wounded 68 In Wenzhou on 13 August 1967 two PLA units mistook each other for rebels and opened fire killing seven people At Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport on 10 August 1967 a firefight caused a panicked commercial pilot to depart early stranding 54 Japanese passengers Military control was imposed over the Daqing Oil Field in March 1967 and over the Anshan Iron and Steel Plant in August 214 217 Unconventional weapons including weapon of mass destruction were seized during conflicts but not directly used Citizens wrote letters to the Zhongnanhai residence of government leaders warning of attacks on facilities that stored pathogenic bacteria poisonous plant samples radioactive substances poison gas toxicants and other dangerous substances In Changchun rebels working in geological institutes developed and tested the first ever dirty bomb testing two radioactive self defense bombs and two radioactive self defense mines on 6 and 11 August 218 220 Nationwide a total of 18 77 million firearms 14 828 artillery pieces 2 719 545 grenades ended up in civilian hands They were used in the course of violent struggles which mostly took place from 1967 to 1968 In Chongqing Xiamen and Changchun tanks armored vehicles and even warships were deployed in combat During the Cultural Revolution Mao emphasized the need to improve medical care in rural China 270 The Rural Cooperative Medical System RCMS developed in the late 1960s 270 In this system each large production brigade established a medical cooperative station staffed by barefoot doctors 270 The medical cooperative stations provided primary health care 270 Barefoot doctors brought healthcare to rural areas where urban trained doctors would not settle They promoted basic hygiene preventive healthcare and family planning and treated common illnesses Immunizations were provided free of charge 9 Public healthcare was highly effective in curbing infectious diseases in rural China 9 For treatment of major diseases rural people traveled to state owned hospitals 270 1968 PurgesA rally in opposition to Liu Shaoqi In May 1968 Mao launched a massive political purge Many people were sent to the countryside to work in reeducation camps Generally the campaign targeted rebels from the CR s earlier more populist phase 239 On 27 July the Red Guards power over the PLA was officially ended and the establishment sent in units to besiege areas that remained untouched by the Guards A year later the Red Guard factions were dismantled entirely Mao predicted that the chaos might begin running its own agenda and be tempted to turn against revolutionary ideology Their purpose had been largely fulfilled Mao and his radical colleagues had largely overturned established power citation needed Liu was expelled from the CCP at the 12th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in September and labelled the headquarters of the bourgeoisie Mao meets with Red Guard leaders July As the Red Guard movement had waned over the preceding year violence by the remaining Red Guards increased on some Beijing campuses Violence was particularly pronounced at Qinghua University where a few thousand hardliners of two factions continued to fight At Mao s initiative on 27 July 1968 tens of thousands of workers entered the Qinghua campus shouting slogans in opposition to the violence Red Guards attacked the workers who remained peaceful Ultimately the workers disarmed the students and occupied the campus 205 206 On 28 July Mao and the Central Group met with the five most important remaining Beijing Red Guard leaders to address the movement s excessive violence and political exhaustion 205 206 It was the only time during the Cultural Revolution that Mao met and addressed the student leaders directly In response to a Red Guard leader s telegram sent prior to the meeting which claimed that some Black Hand had maneuvered the workers against the Red Guards Mao told the student leaders The Black Hand is nobody else but me I asked the workers how to solve the armed fighting in the universities and told them to go there to have a look 210 During the meeting Mao and the Central Group for the Cultural Revolution stated W e want cultural struggle we do not want armed struggle and The masses do not want civil war 217 You have been involved in the Cultural Revolution for two years struggle criticism transformation Now first you re not struggling second you re not criticizing and third you re not transforming Or rather you are struggling but it s an armed struggle The people are not happy the workers are not happy city residents are not happy most people in schools are not happy most of the students even in your schools are not happy Even within the faction that supports you there are unhappy people Is this the way to unify the world Mao s cult of personality and mango fever August A propaganda oil painting of Mao during the Cultural Revolution 1967 In the spring of 1968 a massive campaign aimed at enhancing Mao s reputation began On 4 August Mao was presented with mangoes by the Pakistani foreign minister Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada in an apparent diplomatic gesture Mao had his aide send the box of mangoes to his propaganda team at Tsinghua University on 5 August who were stationed there to quiet strife among Red Guard factions Several months of mango fever followed as the fruit became a focus of a boundless loyalty campaign for Mao More replica mangoes were created and the replicas were sent on tour around Beijing and elsewhere Many revolutionary committees visited the mangoes in Beijing from outlying provinces Approximately half a million people greeted the replicas when they arrived in Chengdu Badges and wall posters featuring the mangoes and Mao were produced in the millions The fruit was shared among all institutions that had been a part of the propaganda team and large processions were organized in support of the precious gift as the mangoes were known A dentist in a small town Dr Han saw the mango and said it was nothing special and looked just like a sweet potato He was put on trial for malicious slander found guilty paraded publicly throughout the town and then shot in the head It has been claimed that Mao used the mangoes to express support for the workers who would go to whatever lengths necessary to end the factional fighting among students and a prime example of Mao s strategy of symbolic support Through early 1969 participants of Mao Zedong Thought study classes in Beijing returned with mass produced mango facsimiles gaining media attention in the provinces Down to the Countryside Movement December In December 1968 Mao began the Down to the Countryside Movement During this movement which lasted for the following decade young bourgeoisie living in cities were ordered to go to the countryside to experience working life The term young intellectuals was used to refer to recent college graduates In the late 1970s these students returned to their home cities Many students who were previously Red Guard supported the movement and Mao s vision This movement was thus in part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities to the countryside where they would cause less social disruption It also served to spread revolutionary ideology geographically 1969 1971 Lin BiaoThe 9th National Congress was held in April 1969 It served as a means to revitalize the party with fresh thinking as well as new cadres after much of the old guard had been destroyed in the struggles of the preceding years 285 The party framework established two decades earlier broke down almost entirely rather than through an election by party members delegates for this Congress were effectively selected by Revolutionary Committees 288 Representation of the military increased by a large margin from the previous Congress reflected in the election of more PLA members to the new Central Committee over 28 Many officers now elevated to senior positions were loyal to PLA Marshal Lin Biao which would open a new rift between the military and civilian leadership 292 We do not only feel boundless joy because we have as our great leader the greatest Marxist Leninist of our era Chairman Mao but also great joy because we have Vice Chairman Lin as Chairman Mao s universally recognized successor Premier Zhou Enlai at the 9th Party Congress Reflecting this Lin was officially elevated to become the Party s preeminent figure outside of Mao with his name written into the party constitution as his closest comrade in arms and universally recognized successor 291 At the time no other Communist parties or governments anywhere in the world had adopted the practice of enshrining a successor to the current leader into their constitutions Lin delivered the keynote address at the Congress a document drafted by hardliner leftists Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao under Mao s guidance 289 The report was heavily critical of Liu Shaoqi and other counter revolutionaries and drew extensively from quotations in the Little Red Book The Congress solidified the central role of Maoism within the party re introducing Maoism as the official guiding ideology in the party constitution The Congress elected a new Politburo with Mao Lin Chen Zhou Enlai and Kang as the members of the new Politburo Standing Committee 290 Lin Chen and Kang were all beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution Zhou who was demoted in rank voiced his unequivocal support for Lin at the Congress 290 Mao restored the function of some formal party institutions such as the operations of the Politburo which ceased functioning between 1966 and 1968 because the CCRG held de facto control 296 In early 1970 the nationwide One Strike Three Anti Campaign was launched by Mao and the Communist Party Central aiming to consolidate the new organs of power by targeting counterrevolutionary thoughts and actions A large number of minor criminals were executed or forced to commit suicide between 1970 and 1972 According to government statistics released after the Cultural Revolution during the campaign 1 87 million people were persecuted as traitors spies and counterrevolutionaries and over 284 800 were arrested or killed from February to November 1970 alone PLA encroachment Mao left and Lin right in 1967 riding in the back of a vehicle during an International Workers Day parade Mao s efforts at re organizing party and state institutions generated mixed results The situation in some of the provinces remained volatile even as the political situation in Beijing stabilized Factional struggles many violent continued at a local level despite the declaration that the 9th National Congress marked a temporary victory for the CR 316 Furthermore despite Mao s efforts to put on a show of unity at the Congress the factional divide between Lin s PLA camp and the Jiang led radical camp was intensifying Indeed a personal dislike of Jiang drew many civilian leaders including Chen closer to Lin 115 Between 1966 and 1968 China was isolated internationally having declared its enmity towards both the USSR and the US The friction with the USSR intensified after border clashes on the Ussuri River in March 1969 as Chinese leaders prepared for all out war 317 In June 1969 the PLA s enforcement of political discipline and suppression of the factions that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution became intertwined with the central Party s efforts to accelerate Third Front Those who did not return to work would be viewed as engaging in schismatic activity which risked undermining preparations to defend China from potential invasion 150 151 In October 1969 the Party attempted to focus more on war preparedness and less on suppressing factions 151 That month senior leaders were evacuated from Beijing Amid the tension Lin issued the Order Number One which appeared to be an executive order to prepare for war to the PLA s eleven military regions on October 18 without going through Mao This drew the ire of the chairman who saw it as evidence that his declared successor was usurping his authority 317 The prospect of war elevated the PLA to greater prominence in domestic politics increasing Lin s stature at Mao s expense 321 Some evidence suggests that Mao was pushed to seek closer relations with the US as a means to avoid PLA dominance that would result from a military confrontation with the Soviet Union 321 During his later meeting with Richard Nixon in 1972 Mao hinted that Lin had opposed better relations with the U S 322 Restoration of State Chairman position Liu Shaoqi on his deathbed in 1969 After Lin was confirmed as Mao s successor his supporters focused on the restoration of the position of State Chairman which had been abolished by Mao after Liu s purge They hoped that by allowing Lin to ease into a constitutionally sanctioned role whether Chairman or vice chairman Lin s succession would be institutionalized The consensus within the Politburo was that Mao should assume the office with Lin as vice chairman but perhaps wary of Lin s ambitions or for other unknown reasons Mao voiced his explicit opposition 327 Factional rivalries intensified at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress in Lushan held in late August 1970 Chen now aligned with the PLA faction loyal to Lin galvanized support for the restoration of the office of President of China despite Mao s wishes Moreover Chen launched an assault on Zhang a staunch Maoist who embodied the chaos of the Cultural Revolution over the evaluation of Mao s legacy 328 331 The attacks on Zhang found favour with many Plenum attendees and may have been construed by Mao as an indirect attack on the CR Mao confronted Chen openly denouncing him as a false Marxist 332 and removed him from the Politburo Standing Committee In addition to the purge of Chen Mao asked Lin s principal generals to write self criticisms on their political positions as a warning to Lin Mao also inducted several of his supporters to the Central Military Commission and placed loyalists in leadership roles of the Beijing Military Region 332 Project 571 By 1971 the diverging interests of the civilian and military leaders was apparent Mao was troubled by the PLA s newfound prominence and the purge of Chen marked the beginning of a gradual scaling down of the PLA s political involvement 353 According to official sources sensing the reduction of Lin s power base and his declining health Lin s supporters plotted to use the military power still at their disposal to oust Mao in a coup Lin s son Lin Liguo along with other high ranking military conspirators formed a coup apparatus in Shanghai and dubbed the plan to oust Mao Outline for Project 571 in the original Mandarin the phrase sounds similar to the term for military uprising It is disputed whether Lin Biao was directly involved in this process While official sources maintain that Lin did plan and execute the coup attempt scholars such as Jin Qiu portray Lin as passive cajoled by elements among his family and supporters Qiu contests that Lin Biao was ever personally involved in drafting the Outline with evidence suggesting that Lin Liguo was directly responsible for the draft Lin s flight and plane crash Graffiti of Lin Biao s foreword to the Little Red Book with his name lower right later scratched out According to the official narrative on 13 September Lin Biao his wife Ye Qun Lin Liguo and members of his staff attempted to flee to the USSR ostensibly to seek political asylum En route Lin s plane crashed in Mongolia killing all on board The plane apparently ran out of fuel A Soviet investigative team was not able to determine the cause of the crash but hypothesized that the pilot was flying low to evade radar and misjudged the plane s altitude The account was questioned by those who raised doubts over Lin s choice of the USSR as a destination the plane s route the identity of the passengers and whether or not a coup was actually taking place On 13 September the Politburo met in an emergency session to discuss Lin His death was confirmed in Beijing only on 30 September which led to the cancellation of the National Day celebration events the following day The Central Committee did not release news of Lin s death to the public until two months later Many Lin supporters sought refuge in Hong Kong Those who remained on the mainland were purged The event caught the party leadership off guard the concept that Lin could betray Mao de legitimized a vast body of Cultural Revolution political rhetoric and by extension Mao s absolute authority For several months following the incident the party information apparatus struggled to find a correct way to frame the incident for public consumption but as the details came to light the majority of the Chinese public felt disillusioned and realised they had been manipulated for political purposes 1972 1976 The Gang of FourThe Gang of Four clockwise from top left Wang Hongwen Zhang Chunqiao Yao Wenyuan Jiang Qing Mao became depressed and reclusive after the Lin incident Sensing a sudden loss of direction Mao reached out to old comrades whom he had denounced in the past Meanwhile in September 1972 Mao transferred a 38 year old cadre from Shanghai Wang Hongwen to Beijing and made him Party vice chairman Wang a former factory worker from a peasant background 357 was seemingly getting groomed for succession 364 Jiang s position strengthened after Lin s flight She held tremendous influence with the radical camp With Mao s health on the decline Jiang s political ambitions began to emerge She allied herself with Wang and propaganda specialists Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan forming a political clique later pejoratively dubbed as the Gang of Four Jiang Qing left receiving Red Guards in Beijing with Zhou Enlai center and Kang Sheng with each holding a copy of the Little Red Book By 1973 round after round of political struggles had left many lower level institutions including local government factories and railways short of competent staff to carry out basic functions 340 China s economy had fallen into disarray which led to the rehabilitation of purged lower level officials The party s core became heavily dominated by Cultural Revolution beneficiaries and radicals whose focus remained ideological purity over economic productivity The economy remained mostly Zhou s domain one of the few remaining moderates Zhou attempted to restore the economy but was resented by the Gang of Four who identified him as their primary political succession threat In late 1973 to weaken Zhou s political position and to distance themselves from Lin s apparent betrayal the Criticize Lin Criticize Confucius campaign began under Jiang s leadership 366 Its stated goals were to purge China of New Confucianist thinking and denounce Lin s actions as traitorous and regressive 372 Deng Xiaoping s rehabilitation 1975 Deng Xiaoping returned to the political scene assuming the post of Vice Premier in March 1973 in the first of a series of Mao approved promotions After Zhou withdrew from active politics in January 1975 Deng was effectively put in charge of the government party and military then adding the additional titles of PLA General Chief of Staff Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission 381 Mao wanted to use Deng as a counterweight to the military faction in government to suppress former Lin loyalists In addition Mao had also lost confidence in the Gang of Four and saw Deng as the alternative Leaving the country in grinding poverty would damage the positive legacy of the CR which Mao worked hard to protect Deng s return set the scene for a protracted factional struggle between the radical Gang of Four and moderates led by Zhou and Deng citation needed At the time Jiang and associates held effective control of mass media and the party s propaganda network while Zhou and Deng held control of most government organs On some decisions Mao sought to mitigate the Gang s influence but on others he acquiesced to their demands The Gang of Four s political and media control did not prevent Deng from enacting his economic policies Deng emphatically opposed Party factionalism and his policies aimed to promote unity to restore economic productivity Much like the post Great Leap restructuring led by Liu Shaoqi Deng streamlined the railway system steel production etc By late 1975 however Mao saw that Deng s economic restructuring might negate the CR s legacy and launched the Counterattack the Right Deviationist Reversal of Verdicts Trend a campaign to oppose rehabilitating the case for the rightists alluding to Deng as the country s foremost rightist Mao directed Deng to write self criticisms in November 1975 a move lauded by the Gang of Four 381 Death of Zhou Enlai On 8 January 1976 Zhou Enlai died of bladder cancer On 15 January Deng delivered Zhou s eulogy in a funeral attended by all of China s most senior leaders with the notable absence of Mao who had grown increasingly critical of Zhou 217 218 610 After Zhou s death Mao selected the relatively unknown Hua Guofeng instead of a member of the Gang of Four or Deng to become Premier The Gang of Four grew apprehensive that spontaneous large scale popular support for Zhou could turn the political tide against them They acted through the media to impose restrictions on public displays of mourning for Zhou Years of resentment over the CR the public persecution of Deng seen as Zhou s ally and the prohibition against public mourning led to a rise in popular discontent against Mao and the Gang of Four Official attempts to enforce the mourning restrictions included removing public memorials and tearing down posters commemorating Zhou s achievements On 25 March 1976 Shanghai s Wen Hui Bao published an article calling Zhou the capitalist roader inside the Party who wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader Deng regain his power These propaganda efforts at smearing Zhou s image however only strengthened public attachment to Zhou s memory 213 214 Tiananmen incident On 4 April 1976 on the eve of China s annual Qingming Festival a traditional day of mourning thousands of people gathered around the Monument to the People s Heroes in Tiananmen Square to commemorate Zhou They honored Zhou by laying wreaths banners poems placards and flowers at the foot of the Monument 612 The most apparent purpose of this memorial was to eulogize Zhou but the Gang of Four were also attacked for their actions against the Premier A small number of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Mao and his Cultural Revolution 218 Up to two million people may have visited Tiananmen Square on 4 April All levels of society from the most impoverished peasants to high ranking PLA officers and the children of high ranking cadres were represented in the activities Those who participated were motivated by a mixture of anger over Zhou s treatment revolt against the Cultural Revolution and apprehension for China s future The event did not appear to have coordinated leadership 218 220 The Central Committee under the leadership of Jiang Qing labelled the event counter revolutionary and cleared the square of memorial items shortly after midnight on April 6 Attempts to suppress the mourners led to a riot Police cars were set on fire and a crowd of over 100 000 people forced its way into several government buildings surrounding the square Many of those arrested were later sentenced to prison Similar incidents occurred in other major cities Jiang and her allies attacked Deng as the incident s mastermind and issued reports on official media to that effect Deng was formally stripped of all positions inside and outside the Party on 7 April This marked Deng s second purge 612 Death of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four s downfall On 9 September 1976 Mao Zedong died To Mao s supporters his death symbolized the loss of China s revolutionary foundation His death was announced on 9 September The nation descended into grief and mourning with people weeping in the streets and public institutions closing for over a week Hua Guofeng chaired the Funeral Committee and delivered the memorial speech Shortly before dying Mao had allegedly written the message With you in charge I m at ease to Hua Hua used this message to substantiate his position as successor Hua had been widely considered to be lacking in political skill and ambitions and seemingly posed no serious threat to the Gang of Four in the race for succession However the Gang s radical ideas also clashed with influential elders and many Party reformers With army backing and the support of Marshal Ye Jianying Director of Central Office Wang Dongxing Vice Premier Li Xiannian and party elder Chen Yun on 6 October the Central Security Bureau s Special Unit 8341 had all members of the Gang of Four arrested in a bloodless coup After Mao s death people characterized as beating smashing looting elements who were seen as having disturbed the social order during the CR were purged or punished Beating smashing looting elements had typically been aligned with rebel factions 359 AftermathTransitional period Although Hua denounced the Gang of Four in 1976 he continued to invoke Mao s name to justify Mao era policies Hua spearheaded what became known as the Two Whatevers Like Deng Hua wanted to reverse the CR s damage but unlike Deng who wanted new economic models for China Hua intended to move the Chinese economic and political system towards Soviet style planning It became increasingly clear to Hua that without Deng it was difficult to continue daily affairs of state On 10 October Deng wrote a letter to Hua asking to be transferred back to state and party affairs party elders also called for Deng s return With increasing pressure from all sides Premier Hua named Deng Vice Premier in July 1977 and later promoted him to various other positions effectively elevating Deng to be China s second most powerful figure In August the 11th National Congress was held in Beijing officially naming in ranking order Hua Guofeng Ye Jianying Deng Xiaoping Li Xiannian and Wang Dongxing as new members of the Politburo Standing Committee Repudiation and reform under Deng Deng Xiaoping became the paramount leader of China in 1978 He started the process of reform and opening up Deng Xiaoping first proposed what he called Boluan Fanzheng in September 1977 in order to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution In May 1978 Deng seized the opportunity to elevate his protege Hu Yaobang to power Hu published an article in the Guangming Daily making clever use of Mao s quotations while lauding Deng s ideas Following this article Hua began to shift his tone in support of Deng On 1 July Deng publicized Mao s self criticism report of 1962 regarding the failure of the Great Leap Forward As his power base expanded in September Deng began openly attacking Hua Guofeng s Two Whatevers The 1978 Truth Criterion Discussion launched by Deng and Hu and their allies also triggered a decade long New Enlightenment movement in mainland China promoting democracy humanism and universal values while opposing the ideology of Cultural Revolution On 18 December 1978 Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee was held Deng called for a liberation of thoughts and urged the party to seek truth from facts and abandon ideological dogma The Plenum officially marked the beginning of the economic reform era Hua Guofeng engaged in self criticism and called his Two Whatevers a mistake At the Plenum the Party reversed its verdict on the Tiananmen Incident Former Chinese president Liu Shaoqi was given a belated state funeral Peng Dehuai who was persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution was rehabilitated in 1978 At the Fifth Plenum held in 1980 Peng Zhen He Long and other leaders who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated Hu Yaobang became head of the party secretariat as its secretary general In September Hua Guofeng resigned and Zhao Ziyang another Deng ally was named premier Hua remained on the Central Military Commission but formal power was transferred to a new generation of pragmatic reformers who reversed Cultural Revolution policies to a large extent Within a few years Deng and Hu helped rehabilitate over 3 million unjust false erroneous cases In particular the trial of the Gang of Four took place in Beijing from 1980 to 1981 and the court stated that 729 511 people had been persecuted by the Gang of whom 34 800 were said to have died In 1981 the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution and declared that the Cultural Revolution was responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party the country and the people since the founding of the People s Republic AtrocitiesDeath toll A struggle session in September 1967 targeting Xi Zhongxun the father of Xi Jinping who had been labeled an anti party element Fatality estimates vary across different sources ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions or even tens of millions In addition to various regimes of secrecy and obfuscation concerning the Revolution both top down as perpetuated by authorities as well as laterally among the Chinese public in the decades since the discrepancies are due in large part to the totalistic nature of the Revolution itself it is a significant challenge for historians to discern whether and in what ways discrete events that took place during the Cultural Revolution should be ascribed to it Most deaths occurred after the mass movements ended when organized campaigns attempted to consolidate order in workplaces and communities 172 As Walder summarizes The cure for factional warfare was far worse than the disease Serious man made disasters such as the 1975 Banqiao Dam failure also caused many deaths Literature reviews of the overall death toll due to the Cultural Revolution usually include the following Time Source Deaths in millions Remarks2014 Andrew G Walder 1 1 1 6 Examines the period between 1966 and 1971 Walder reviewed the reported deaths in 2 213 annals from every county and interpreted the annals vague language in the most conservative manner For instance some died and a couple died were interpreted as zero death while death in the scale of tens hundreds thousands were interpreted as ten a hundred a thousand died The reported deaths underestimate the actual deaths especially because some annals actively covered up deaths Annal editors were supervised by the CCP Propaganda Department In 2003 Walder and Yang Su coauthored a paper along this approach but with fewer county annals available at the time 1999 Ding Shu 2 Ding s figures include 100 000 killed in the Red Terror during 1966 with 200 000 forced to commit suicide plus 300 000 500 000 killed in violent struggles 500 000 during Cleansing the Class Ranks 200 000 during One Strike Three Anti Campaign and the Anti May Sixteenth Elements Campaign 1996 CCP History Research Center 1 728 The 1 728 million were counted as unnatural deaths among which 9 4 162 000 were CCP party members and 252 000 were intellectuals The figures were extracted from 建国以来历次政治运动事实 Facts on the Successive Political Movements since the Founding of the PRC a book by the party s History Research Center which states that according to CCP internal investigations in 1978 and 1984 21 44 million were investigated 125 million got implicated in these investigations 4 2 million were detained by Red Guards and other non police 1 3 million were arrested by police 1 728 million of unnatural deaths 135 000 were executed for crimes of counter revolution during violent struggles 237 000 were killed and 7 03 million became disabled While these internal investigations were never mentioned or published in any other official documents the scholarly consensus found these figures very reasonable 1991 Rudolph J Rummel 7 731 Rummel included his estimate of Laogai camp deaths in this figure He estimated that 5 of the 10 million people in the Laogai camps died each year of the 12 year period and that this amounts to roughly 6 million 1982 Ye Jianying 3 42 20 Several sources have quoted a statement made by Marshal Ye Jianying of 683 000 deaths in the cities 2 5 million deaths in the countryside plus 123 700 deaths due to violent struggles and 115 500 deaths due to struggle sessions and imprisonment in addition to 557 000 people missing In a 2012 interview with Hong Kong s Open Magazine an unnamed bureaucrat in Beijing claimed that Ye made the statement in a 1982 CCP meeting while he was the party s Vice Chairman Several sources have also quoted that Marshal Ye estimated the death toll to be 20 million during a CCP working conference in December 1978 1979 Agence France Presse 0 4 This figure was obtained by an AFP correspondent in Beijing citing an unnamed but usually reliable source In 1986 Maurice Meisner referred to this number as a widely accepted nationwide figure but also said The toll may well have been higher It is unlikely that it was less Jonathan Leightner asserted that the number is perhaps one of the best estimates Massacres Quotations of Mao Zedong on a street wall of Wuxuan County one of the centers of the Guangxi Massacre Massacres took place across China including in Guangxi Inner Mongolia Guangdong Yunnan Hunan Ruijin and Qinghai as well as Red August in Beijing These massacres were mainly led and organized by local revolutionary committees Communist Party branches militia and the military Most victims were members of the Five Black Categories as well as their children or members of rebel groups Chinese scholars have estimated that at least 300 000 people died in these massacres Collective killings in Guangxi and Guangdong were among the most serious In Guangxi the official annals of at least 43 counties have records of massacres with 15 of them reporting a death toll of over 1 000 while in Guangdong at least 28 county annals record massacres with 6 of them reporting a death toll of over 1 000 Official sources in 1980 revealed that during the Red August at least 1 772 people were killed by Red Guards including teachers and principals of many schools meanwhile 33 695 homes were ransacked and 85 196 families were forced to flee The Daxing Massacre in rural Beijing caused the deaths of 325 people from 27 August to 1 September 1966 those killed ranged from 80 years old to a 38 day old baby with 22 families being completely wiped out In Dao County Hunan a total of 7 696 people were killed from 13 August to 17 October 1967 in addition to 1 397 forced to commit suicide and 2 146 becoming permanently disabled In the Guangxi Massacre the official record shows an estimated death toll from 100 000 to 150 000 as well as cannibalism primarily between 1967 and 1968 in Guangxi where one of the worst violent struggles of the Revolution took place before Zhou sent the PLA to intervene 545 In 1975 the PLA led a massacre in Yunnan around the town of Shadian targeting Hui people resulting in the deaths of more than 1 600 civilians including 300 children and the destruction of 4 400 homes Violent struggles struggle sessions and purges The Cultural Revolution Cemetery in Chongqing where 400 500 people killed in factional clashes are buried out of a total of at least 1 700 deaths Violent struggles were factional conflicts mostly among Red Guards and rebel groups that began in Shanghai and then spread to other areas in 1967 They brought the country to a state of civil war Weapons used included some 18 77 million guns 2 72 million grenades 14 828 cannons millions of other ammunition and even armored cars and tanks Notable violent struggles include the battles in Chongqing in Sichuan and in Xuzhou Researchers claimed that the nationwide death toll in violent struggles ranged from 300 000 to 500 000 The recorded rate of violence rose in 1967 reaching a peak that summer before dropping suddenly During 1967 casualties were relatively low as the weapons used were primarily clubs spears and rocks until late July Although firearms and heavier weapons began to spread during summer most were neither trained nor committed fighters and therefore casualties remained relatively low The peak of collective violence in summer 1967 dropped sharply after August when Mao became concerned about rebel attacks on local army units and thereafter made clear that his prior calls to drag out army commanders was a mistake and he would instead support besieged army commands 150 The greatest number of casualties occurred during the process of restoring order in 1968 although the overall number of violent conflicts was lower Walder stated that while rising casualties from a smaller number of insurgent conflicts surely reflected the increasing scale and organizational coherence of rebel factions and their growing access to military weaponry another important factor was that t he longer that local factional warfare continued without the prospect of an equitable political settlement the greater the stakes for the participants and the more intense the collective violence as factions fought to avoid the consequence of losing 154 155 In addition to violent struggles millions of Chinese were violently persecuted especially via struggle sessions Those identified as spies running dogs revisionists or coming from a suspect class including those related to former landlords or rich peasants were subject to beating imprisonment rape torture sustained and systematic harassment and abuse seizure of property denial of medical attention and erasure of social identity Some people were not able to stand the torture and committed suicide Researchers claimed that at least 100 000 to 200 000 people committed suicide during the early CR At the same time many unjust false and mistaken cases appeared due to political purges In addition to those who died in massacres a large number of people died or became permanently disabled due to lynching or other forms of persecution From 1968 to 1969 the Cleansing the Class Ranks purge caused the deaths of at least 500 000 people Purges of similar nature such as the One Strike Three Anti Campaign and the campaign towards the May Sixteenth elements were launched in the 1970s For example a political purge in Yunnan province the Zhao Jianmin spy case resulted in 17 000 deaths and wrongfully persecuted a total of 1 38 million people Repression of ethnic minorities The Panchen Lama during a struggle sessionStruggle session of Sampho Tsewang Rigzin and his wife The Cultural Revolution wrought havoc on minority cultures and ethnicities Languages and customs of ethnic minorities in China were labeled as part of the Four Olds texts in ethnic languages were burned and bilingual education was suppressed In Inner Mongolia some 790 000 people were persecuted during the Inner Mongolia incident Of these 22 900 were beaten to death and 120 000 were maimed 258 during a witch hunt to find members of the alleged separatist New Inner Mongolian People s Revolutionary Party In Xinjiang copies of the Qur an and other books of the Uyghur people were apparently burned Muslim imams reportedly were paraded around with paint splashed on their bodies In the ethnic Korean areas of northeast China clashes took place In Yunnan Province the palace of the Dai people s king was torched and a massacre of Muslim Hui people at the hands of the PLA in Yunnan known as the Shadian incident reportedly claimed over 1 600 lives in 1975 After the Cultural Revolution the government gave reparations for the Shadian Incident including the erection of a Martyr s Memorial in Shadian Concessions to minorities were abolished during the Cultural Revolution as part of the Red Guards attack on the Four Olds People s communes previously only established in parts of Tibet were established throughout Tibetan Autonomous Region in 1966 removing Tibet s exemption from China s land reform and reimposed in other minority areas The effect on Tibet was particularly severe as it came following the repression after the 1959 Tibetan uprising The destruction of nearly all of its over 6 000 monasteries which began before the Cultural Revolution were often conducted with the complicity of local ethnic Tibetan Red Guards 9 Only eight were intact by the end of the 1970s Many monks and nuns were killed and the general population was subjected to physical and psychological torture 9 An estimated 600 000 monks and nuns lived in Tibet in 1950 but by 1979 most were dead imprisoned or had disappeared 22 The Tibetan government in exile claimed that many Tibetans died from famines in 1961 1964 and 1968 1973 as a result of forced collectivization however the number of Tibetan deaths or whether famines in fact took place in these periods is disputed Despite persecution some local leaders and minority ethnic practices survived in remote regions It was felt that pushing minority groups too hard would compromise China s border defenses This was especially important as minorities make up a large percentage of the population that live in border regions In the late 1960s China experienced a period of strained relations with some of its neighbors notably with the Soviet Union and India Rape and sexual abuse Pan Suiming Emily Honig and others documented that rape and sexual abuse of sent down women were common during the Cultural Revolution s height Tania Branigan documented that women raped tended to be from educated urban backgrounds while their rapists were poor peasants or local officials Cultural impact and influenceRed Guards riot A 1968 map of Beijing showing streets and landmarks renamed during the Cultural Revolution Andingmen Inner Street became Great Leap Forward Road Taijichang Street became the Road for Eternal Revolution Dongjiaominxiang was renamed Anti Imperialist Road Beihai Park was renamed Worker Peasant Soldier Park and Jingshan Park became Red Guard Park Most of the Cultural Revolution era name changes were later reversed The revolution aimed to destroy the Four Olds and establish the corresponding Four News which ranged from changing of names and cutting of hair to ransacking homes vandalizing cultural treasures and desecrating temples 61 64 The revolution aimed to eliminate cow demons and snake spirits the class enemies who promoted bourgeois ideas as well as those from an exploitative family background or who belonged to one of the Five Black Categories Large numbers of people perceived to be monsters and demons regardless of guilt or innocence were publicly denounced humiliated and beaten In their revolutionary fervor students especially the Red Guards denounced their teachers and children denounced their parents 59 61 Many died from ill treatment or committed suicide In 1968 youths were mobilized to go to the countryside in the Down to the Countryside Movement so they may learn from the peasantry and the departure of millions from the cities helped end the most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution 176 Academics and intellectuals Yao Tongbin one of China s foremost missile scientists was beaten to death by a mob in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution 1968 This caused Zhou Enlai to order special protection for key technical experts Academics and intellectuals were regarded as the Stinking Old Ninth and were widely persecuted Many were sent to rural labor camps such as the May Seventh Cadre School The prosecution of the Gang of Four revealed that 142 000 cadres and teachers in the education circles were persecuted Academics scientists and educators who died included Xiong Qinglai Jian Bozan Wu Han Rao Yutai Wu Dingliang Yao Tongbin and Zhao Jiuzhang As of 1968 among the 171 senior members who worked at the headquarters of Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing 131 were persecuted Among the members of the academy 229 died As of September 1971 more than 4 000 staff members of China s nuclear center in Qinghai had been persecuted while more than 310 were disabled over 40 committed suicide and 5 were executed Despite the hardships some significant achievements came in science and technology scientists tested the first missile created China s first hydrogen bomb and launched China s first satellite in the Two Bombs One Satellite program Many health personnel were deployed to the countryside as barefoot doctors Some farmers were given informal medical training and health care centers were established in rural communities This process led to a marked improvement in health and life expectancy Education system In the early months of Cultural Revolution schools and universities were closed Secondary school classes of 1966 1967 and 1968 were unable to graduate on time later and became known as the Old Three Cohort 老三届 362 Colleges and universities were closed until 1970 and most universities did not reopen until 1972 164 University entrance exams were cancelled after 1966 until the beginning of Boluan Fanzheng period in 1977 replaced by a system whereby students were recommended by factories villages and military units Traditional values were abandoned 195 On the other hand industrial Universities were established in factories to supply technical and engineering programs for industrial workers inspired by Mao s July 1968 remarks advocating vocational education 362 Factories around the country therefore established their own educational programs for technicians and engineers and by 1976 there were 15 000 such 21 July Universities 92 Meanwhile in the initial stage of the Down to the Countryside Movement most of the youth who took part volunteered Later on the government forced them to move Between 1968 and 1979 17 million urban youth left for the countryside Living in the rural areas deprived them of higher education 10 This generation is sometimes referred to as the lost generation In the post Mao period many of those forcibly moved attacked the policy as a violation of their human rights 36 Formal literacy measurements did not resume until the 1980s Some counties in Zhanjiang had literacy rates as low as 59 20 years after the revolution This was amplified by the elimination of qualified teachers many districts were forced to rely on students to teach Primary and middle schools gradually reopened during the Cultural Revolution Schooling years were reduced and education standard fell but the proportion of Chinese children who completed primary education increased from less than half to almost all and the fraction who completed junior middle school rose from 15 to over two thirds Educational opportunities for rural children expanded while education of the urban elite were restricted by anti elitist policies 166 167 Radical policies provided many in rural communities with middle school education for the first time 163 Rural infrastructure developed during this period facilitated by the political changes that empowered ordinary rurals 177 Slogans and rhetoric A Red Guard holding up the Selected Works of Mao Zedong with revolution is no crime to rebel is justified written on a flag next to him 1967 Huang claimed that the Cultural Revolution had massive effects on Chinese society because of the extensive use of political slogans He claimed that slogans played a central role in rallying Party leadership and citizens For example the slogan to rebel is justified 造反有理 zaofǎn yǒulǐ affected many views The remnants of a banner containing slogans from the Cultural Revolution in Anhui Huang asserted that slogans were ubiquitous in people s lives printed onto everyday items such as bus tickets cigarette packets and mirror tables 14 Workers were supposed to grasp revolution and promote productions while peasants were supposed to raise more pigs because more pigs means more manure and more manure means more grain Even a casual remark by Mao Sweet potato tastes good I like it became a slogan page needed Political slogans had three sources Mao Party media such as People s Daily and the Red Guards Mao often offered vague yet powerful directives that divided the Red Guards These directives could be interpreted to suit personal interests in turn aiding factions goals in claiming loyalty to Mao Red Guard slogans were violent advancing themes such as Strike the enemy down on the floor and step on him with a foot Long live the red terror and Those who are against Chairman Mao will have their dog skulls smashed into pieces page needed Dittmer and Ruoxi claim that the Chinese language had historically been defined by subtlety delicacy moderation and honesty as well as the cultivation of a refined and elegant literary style This changed during the CR These slogans were an effective method of thought reform mobilizing millions in a concerted attack upon the subjective world while at the same time reforming their objective world page needed 12 Dittmer and Chen argued that the emphasis on politics made language into effective propaganda but also transformed it into a jargon of stereotypes pompous repetitive and boring 12 To distance itself from the era Deng s government cut back on political slogans During a eulogy for Deng s death Jiang Zemin called the Cultural Revolution a grave mistake Arts and literature In 1966 Jiang Qing advanced the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Black Line Those perceived to be bourgeois anti socialist or anti Mao black line should be cast aside and called for the creation of new literature and arts 352 353 Disseminators of the old culture would be eradicated The majority of writers and artists were seen as black line figures and reactionary literati and were persecuted and subjected to criticism and denunciation where they could be humiliated and ravaged and be imprisoned or sent to hard labour 213 214 For instance Mei Zhi and her husband were sent to a tea farm in Lushan County Sichuan She did not resume writing until the 1980s In 1970 the CCP came to view the Ministry of Culture as so disruptive that it decided to dissolve the Ministry and establish a Culture Group within the State Council in an effort to rein in cultural politics 160 The principles for cultural production laid out by Mao in the 1942 Talks at the Yan an Forum on Art and Literature became dogmatized The literary situation eased after 1972 as more were allowed to write and many provincial literary periodicals resumed publication but the majority of writers still could not work 219 20 Documents released in 1980 regarding the prosecution of the Gang of Four show that more than 2 600 people in the field of arts and literature were persecuted by the Ministry of Culture Many died the names of 200 writers and artists who were persecuted to death were commemorated in 1979 These include writers such as Lao She Fu Lei Deng Tuo Baren Li Guangtian Yang Shuo and Zhao Shuli 213 14 Opera and music The ballet The Red Detachment of Women one of the Model Dramas promoted during the Cultural Revolution Jiang took control of the stage and introduced revolutionary operas under her direct supervision Traditional operas were banned as they were considered feudalistic and bourgeois but revolutionary opera which modified Peking opera in both content and form was promoted 115 Six operas and two ballets were produced in the first three years most notably the opera The Legend of the Red Lantern These operas were the only approved opera form Other opera troupes were required to adopt or change their repertoire 176 Loyalty dances became common and were performed throughout the country by both professional cultural workers and ordinary people 362 The model operas were broadcast on the radio made into films blared from public loudspeakers taught to students in schools and workers in factories and became ubiquitous as a form of popular entertainment and were the only theatrical entertainment for millions 352 53 115 Most model dramas featured women as their leads and promoted Chinese state feminism Their narratives begin with them oppressed by misogyny class position and imperialism before liberating themselves through the discovery of internal strength and the CCP During the Cultural Revolution composers of Yellow Music which had already been banned following the communist revolution were persecuted including Li Jinhui who was killed in 1967 Revolution themed songs instead were promoted and songs such as Ode to the Motherland Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman The East Is Red and Without the Communist Party There Would Be No New China were either written or became popular during this period The East Is Red especially became popular it de facto supplanted March of the Volunteers lyrics author Tian Han persecuted to death as the national anthem of China though the latter was later restored to its previous place Moreover quotation songs in which Mao s quotations were set to music were particularly popular during the early years of the Cultural Revolution 34 Records of quotation songs were played over loudspeakers their primary distribution 35 as the use of transistor radios lagged until 1976 32 33 Rusticated youths with an interest in broadcast technology frequently operated rural radio stations after 1968 42 Visual arts Posters from the Cultural Revolution period Traditional themes were sidelined and artists such as Feng Zikai Shi Lu and Pan Tianshou were persecuted 97 Many of the artists were assigned to manual labour and artists were expected to depict subjects that glorified the Cultural Revolution related to their labour 351 52 In 1971 in part to alleviate their suffering several leading artists were recalled from manual labour or freed from captivity under a Zhou initiative to decorate hotels and railway stations defaced by Red Guard slogans Zhou said that the artworks were meant for foreigners therefore were outer art and not under the obligations and restrictions placed on inner art meant for Chinese citizens He claimed that landscape paintings should not be considered one of the Four Olds However Zhou was weakened by cancer and in 1974 the Jiang faction seized these and other paintings and mounted exhibitions in Beijing Shanghai and other cities denouncing the artworks as Black Paintings 368 376 Propaganda in posters was used as a mass communication device and often served as the people s leading source of information They were produced in large numbers and widely disseminated and were used by the government and Red Guards to push ideology defined by the Party The two main posters genres were the big character poster or dazibao and commercial propaganda poster 7 12 The dazibao presented slogans poems commentary and graphics often posted on walls in public spaces factories and communes Mao wrote his own dazibao at Beijing University on 5 August 1966 calling on the people to Bombard the Headquarters 5 Xuanchuanhua or propaganda paintings were artworks produced by the government and sold cheaply in stores to be displayed in homes or workplaces The artists for these posters might be amateurs or uncredited professionals and the posters were largely in a Socialist Realist visual style with specific conventions for example images of Mao were to be depicted as red smooth and luminescent 7 12 360 Some scholar also argued that before this period relatively few cultural productions reflected the lives of peasants and workers and during the revolution the struggles of workers peasants and revolutionary soldiers became frequent artistic subjects often created by peasants and workers themselves The spread of peasant paintings in rural China for example became one of the newborn things celebrated in a socialist society Film The Four Hundred Films to be Criticized booklet was distributed and film directors and actors actresses were criticized with some tortured and imprisoned 401 02 These included many of Jiang Qing s rivals and former friends Those who died in the period included Cai Chusheng Zheng Junli Shangguan Yunzhu Wang Ying and Xu Lai No feature films were produced in mainland China for seven years apart from a few approved Model dramas and highly ideological films A notable example is Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy China rejected Hollywood films and most foreign films 213 Albanian films and North Korean films developed mass audiences in China 213 In 1972 Chinese officials invited Michelangelo Antonioni to China to film the achievements of the Cultural Revolution Antonioni made the documentary Chung Kuo Cina When it was released in 1974 CCP leadership in China interpreted the film as reactionary and anti Chinese Viewing art through the principles of the Yan an Talks particularly the concept that there is no such thing as art for art s sake party leadership construed Antonioni s aesthetic choices as politically motivated and banned the film 13 14 Mobile film units brought Chinese cinema to the countryside and were crucial to the standardization and popularization of culture during this period particularly including revolutionary model operas 30 During the Cultural Revolution s early years mobile film teams traveled to rural areas with news reels of Mao meeting with Red Guards and Tiananmen Square parades which became known as red treasure films 110 The release of the filmed versions of the revolutionary model operas resulted in a re organization and expansion of China s film exhibition network 73 From 1965 to 1976 the number of film projection units in China quadrupled total film audiences nearly tripled and the national film attendance rate doubled 133 The Cultural Revolution Group drastically reduced ticket prices which in its view would allow film to better serve the needs of workers and of socialism 133 Historical sites Buddhist statues defaced during the Cultural Revolution China s historical sites artifacts and archives suffered devastating damage as they were thought to be at the root of old ways of thinking Artifacts were seized museums and private homes ransacked and any item found that was thought to represent bourgeois or feudal ideas was destroyed Few records relate how much was destroyed Western observers suggest that much of China s thousands of years of history was in effect destroyed or later smuggled abroad for sale Chinese historians compare the suppression to Qin Shi Huang s great Confucian purge Religious persecution intensified during this period as religion was viewed in opposition to Marxist Leninist and Maoist thinking 73 The destruction of historical relics was never formally sanctioned by the Party whose official policy was instead to protect such items On 14 May 1967 the Central Committee issued Several suggestions for the protection of cultural relics and books during the Cultural Revolution 21 Despite this enormous damage was inflicted on China s cultural heritage For example a survey in 1972 in Beijing of 18 cultural heritage sites including the Temple of Heaven and Ming Tombs showed extensive damage Of the 80 cultural heritage sites in Beijing under municipal protection 30 were destroyed and of the 6 843 cultural sites under protection by Beijing government decision in 1958 4 922 were damaged or destroyed Numerous valuable old books paintings and other cultural relics were burnt 98 Later archaeological excavation and preservation after the destructive period were protected and several significant discoveries such as the Terracotta Army and the Mawangdui occurred after the peak of the Revolution 21 Nevertheless the most prominent medium of academic research in archaeology the journal Kaogu did not publish After the most violent phase the attack on traditional culture continued in 1973 with the Anti Lin Biao Anti Confucius Campaign as part of the struggle against moderate Party elements Media During the early period of the Cultural Revolution freedom of the press in China was at its peak While the number of newspapers declined in this period the number of independent publications by mass political organizations grew According to China s National Bureau of Statistics the number of newspapers dropped from 343 in 1965 to 49 in 1966 and then to a 20th century low of 43 in 1967 At the same time the number of publications by mass organizations such as Red Guards grew to an estimated number as high as 10 000 Independent political groups could publish broadsheets and handbills as well as leaders speeches and meeting transcripts which would normally have been considered highly classified 24 From 1966 to 1969 at least 5 000 new broadsheets by independent political groups were published 60 Several Red Guard organizations also operated independent printing presses to publish newspapers articles speeches and big character posters For example the largest student organization in Shanghai the Red Revolutionaries established a newspaper that had a print run of 800 000 copies by the end of 1966 58 59 Foreign relationsThe Embassy of China Jakarta after being burned The functions of China s embassies abroad were disrupted during the early part of the Cultural Revolution In a 22 March 1969 meeting on the Sino Soviet border clashes Mao stated that in foreign relations China was now isolated and we need to relax a little 287 Later that year China began to restore its embassies to normal functioning 287 However the Sino Soviet conflict culminated in 1969 and according to declassified documents from both China and the United States the Soviet Union planned to launch a large scale nuclear strike on China after the Zhenbao Island incident in 1969 The planned targets include Beijing Changchun Anshan and China s missile launch centers of Jiuquan Xichang and Lop Nur This crisis almost led to a major nuclear war seven years after the Cuban missile crisis Eventually the Soviet called off the attack due to the intervention from the United States China exported communist revolutions as well as communist ideologies to multiple countries in Southeast Asia supporting parties in Indonesia Malaysia Vietnam Laos Myanmar and in particular the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia responsible for the Cambodian genocide It is estimated that at least 90 of the Khmer Rouge s foreign aid came from China In 1975 alone at least US 1 billion in interest free economic and military aid and US 20 million came from China China s economic malaise impacted China s ability to assist North Vietnam in its war against South Vietnam by the 1970s which cooled relations between the once allied nations EvaluationsOn 27 June 1981 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party adopted the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People s Republic of China an official assessment of major historical events since 1949 The Resolution declared that the Cultural Revolution was responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the people the country and the party since the founding of the People s Republic After the Cultural Revolution a massive social and cultural movement known as the New Enlightenment took place in mainland China since the late 1970s The movement lasted throughout the 1980s and opposed the ideology of Cultural Revolution and feudalism The New Enlightenment movement ended due to the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre in June 1989 After Deng Xiaoping s southern tour in early 1992 however intellectuals in mainland China became divided and formed two major schools of thought the Liberalism and the New Left which held different views on the Cultural Revolution Meanwhile Maoist scholars hold another view citation needed To this day public discussion of the Cultural Revolution is still limited within mainland China The Chinese government continues to prohibit news organizations from mentioning details and online discussions and books about the topic are subject to official scrutiny Textbooks abide by the official view of the events Many government documents from the 1960s onward remain classified Despite inroads by prominent sinologists independent scholarly research is discouraged Mao Zedong s legacy remains in some dispute During the anniversary of his birth many people viewed Mao as a godlike figure and referred to him as the people s great savior Contemporary discussions in the CCP owned tabloid Global Times continue to glorify Mao Rather than focus on consequences state media newspapers claim that revolutions typically have a brutal side and are unable to be viewed from the humanitarian perspective Critics of Mao Zedong look at the actions that occurred under his leadership from the point of view that he was better at conquering power than at ruling the country and developing a socialist economy Mao went to extreme measures on his path to power costing millions of lives then and during his rule See alsoHistory of the Chinese Communist Party History of the People s Republic of China List of campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party Maoism Marxism Leninism Maoism Marxist cultural analysisNotesThis position effectively China s de jure head of state was renamed President in 1982 Some claim 1 877 million why ReferencesCitations Song Yongyi 25 August 2011 Chronology of Mass Killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution 1966 1976 Sciences Po Archived from the original on 14 January 2024 Retrieved 27 December 2019 Wang Youqin 2001 Student Attacks Against Teachers The Revolution of 1966 PDF The University of Chicago Archived PDF from the original on 23 December 2018 Translation Glossary for the CR 10 Project PDF University of Pittsburgh Retrieved 28 November 2023 Lu Xing 2004 Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution The Impact on Chinese Thought p 2 Known to the Chinese as the ten years of chaos Thornton Patricia M 2019 Cultural Revolution In Sorace Christian Franceschini 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1017 9781009099028 ISBN 978 1 009 09902 8 Gong Y L Chao L M September 1982 The role of barefoot doctors American Journal of Public Health 72 9 Suppl 59 61 doi 10 2105 ajph 72 9 suppl 59 ISSN 0090 0036 PMC 1650037 PMID 7102877 Liu Shaoqi rehabilitated www marxists org Retrieved 10 June 2020 Russo Alessandro 2020 Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture Durham NC Duke University Press ISBN 978 1 4780 1218 4 Murck Alfreda 2013 Mao s Golden Mangoes and the Cultural Revolution University of Chicago Press ISBN 978 3 85881 732 7 Walder Andrew G 2015 China Under Mao Harvard University Press pp 280 281 ISBN 978 0 674 05815 6 Daniel Leese 2011 Mao Cult Rhetoric and Ritual in China s Cultural Revolution Cambridge University Press pp 221 222 ISBN 978 1 139 49811 1 Moore Malcolm 7 March 2013 How China came to worship the mango during the Cultural Revolution The Daily Telegraph Beijing Archived from the original on 20 November 2015 Retrieved 28 January 2016 Marks Ben The Mao Mango Cult of 1968 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funeral black veil on her head expressionless face Phoenix Television in Chinese Archived from the original on 6 December 2011 Retrieved 7 May 2020 Forster Keith 1992 China s Coup of October 1976 Modern China 18 3 263 303 doi 10 1177 009770049201800302 JSTOR 189334 S2CID 143387271 Harding Harry 1987 China s second revolution reform after Mao Washington D C The Brookings Institution ISBN 978 0 8157 3462 8 Rozman Gilbert 1987 The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism 1978 1985 Princeton University Press pp 63 68 doi 10 1515 9781400858590 ISBN 978 1400858590 Ferdinand Pete 8 July 2016 1986 McCauley Martin M Carter Stephen eds China Leadership and Succession in the Soviet Union Eastern Europe and China New York Routledge 194 204 doi 10 4324 9781315494890 ISBN 9781315494890 Basic Knowledge about the Communist Party of China The Eleventh Congress Archived from the original on 24 June 2007 Bradsher Keith Wellman William J 20 August 2008 Hua Guofeng Transitional Leader of China After Mao Is Dead at 87 The New York Times ISSN 0362 4331 Retrieved 16 March 2022 Barme Geremie R History for the Masses Morning Sun Retrieved 16 March 2022 Xu Jilin December 2000 The fate of an enlightenment twenty years in the Chinese intellectual sphere 1978 98 PDF East Asian History 20 Australian National University 169 186 Li Huaiyin 2012 Challenging the Revolutionary Orthodoxy New Enlightenment Historiography in the 1980s Reinventing Modern China Imagination and Authenticity in Chinese Historical Writing University of Hawaiʻi Press ISBN 9780824836085 Legvold Robert Andrew Christopher Mitrokhin Vasili 2006 The World Was Going Our Way The KGB and the Battle for the Third World Foreign Affairs 85 1 158 ISSN 0015 7120 JSTOR 20031879 胡耀邦同志领导平反 六十一人案 追记 www hybsl cn in Chinese People s Daily 1 June 1989 Archived from the original on 3 January 2021 Retrieved 17 February 2020 Sterba James P The New York Times 25 January 1981 关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议 The Central People s Government of the People s Republic of China in Chinese Retrieved 23 April 2020 Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People s Republic of China PDF Wilson Center 27 June 1981 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People s Republic of China Resolution on CPC History Retrieved 19 November 2023 via www marxists org Beijing Revises Correct Version of Party History Ahead of Centenary Radio Free Asia Retrieved 20 May 2021 Cole J Michael 22 April 2021 The Chinese Communist Party is playing dangerous games with history iPolitics Archived from the original on 22 April 2021 Retrieved 20 May 2021 With whiffs of Cultural Revolution Xi calls for struggle 50 times Nikkei Retrieved 20 May 2021 Chirot Daniel 1996 Modern Tyrants The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age Princeton University Press p 198 ISBN 978 0 691 02777 7 At least one million died though some estimates of deaths go as high as 20 million Song Yongyi 11 October 2011 文革中到底 非正常死亡 了多少人 读苏扬的 文革中中国农村的集体屠杀 How many really died in the Cultural Revolution After reading Su Yang s Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution China News Digest in Chinese Archived from the original on 24 June 2022 Ling Zhijun Ma Licheng 30 January 2011 四人帮 被粉碎后的怪事 文革 之风仍在继续吹 The strange thing after the collapse of the Gang of Four the wind of Cultural Revolution continued to blow People s Daily in Chinese Archived from the original on 22 June 2020 粉碎 四人帮 之后 叶剑英在一次讲话中沉痛地说 文化大革命 死了2000万人 整了1亿人 浪费了8000亿人民币 Pye Lucian W 1986 Reassessing the Cultural Revolution The China Quarterly 108 108 597 612 doi 10 1017 S0305741000037085 ISSN 0305 7410 JSTOR 653530 S2CID 153730706 See for example Huo cheng Li Chinese Communists reveal for the first time the number 20 million deaths for the Cultural Revolution Ming Bao Daily News 26 10 1981 p 3 Remembering the dark days of China s Cultural Revolution South China Morning Post 18 August 2012 Archived from the original on 9 June 2018 Retrieved 29 November 2019 According to a working conference of the Communist Party s Central Committee in 1978 20 million Chinese died in the revolution 100 million were persecuted and 800 billion yuan was wasted Strauss Valerie Southerl Daniel 17 July 1994 How Many Died New Evidence Suggests Far Higher Numbers For the Victims of Mao Zedong s Era The Washington Post ISSN 0190 8286 Archived from the original on 9 May 2019 Retrieved 9 May 2019 Wang Youqin 15 December 2007 Finding a Place for the Victims The Problem in Writing the History of the Cultural Revolution China Perspectives in French 2007 4 doi 10 4000 chinaperspectives 2593 ISSN 2070 3449 Walder Andrew G 2019 Agents of disorder inside China s Cultural Revolution Cambridge MA Harvard University Press p 23 ISBN 978 0 674 24363 7 Walder Andrew G 2019 Agents of disorder inside China s Cultural Revolution Cambridge MA Harvard University Press p 143 ISBN 978 0 674 24363 7 Yan Fei June 2016 政治運動中的集體暴力 非正常死亡 再回顧 1966 1976 Collective violence in political movements a review of the unnatural deaths 1966 1976 PDF Twenty First Century in Chinese 155 64 65 74 Jin Zhong 7 October 2012 最新版文革死亡人數 The latest version of the Cultural Revolution death toll Open Magazine in Chinese Hong Kong Archived from the original on 29 June 2022 Walder Andrew G 2014 Rebellion and Repression in China 1966 1971 Social Science History 38 3 4 513 39 doi 10 1017 ssh 2015 23 S2CID 143087356 Song Yongyi 3 April 2017 广西文革绝密档案中的大屠杀和性暴力 Massacres and sexual violence recorded in the classified documents of the Cultural Revolution in Guangxi China News Digest Archived from the original on 22 June 2022 Walder Andrew G Su Yang 2003 The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside Scope Timing and Human Impact The China Quarterly 173 173 74 99 doi 10 1017 S0009443903000068 ISSN 0305 7410 JSTOR 20058959 S2CID 43671719 兩百萬人含恨而終 文革死亡人數統計 Open Magazine in Chinese Hong Kong August 1999 A different version appears in Ding Shu 15 March 2004 文革死亡人数的一家之言 Home report on the Cultural Revolution s death toll China News Digest in Chinese 文革五十周年 必须再来一次反文革 Fiftieth anniversary of the Cultural Revolution It must be opposed once again 胡耀邦史料信息网 Consensus Net 2016 Archived from the original on 25 June 2020 Title unknown Zhengming Magazine Hong Kong October 1996 中共一九七八年和一九八四年的内部调查 两千一百四十四万余人受到审查 冲击 一亿两千五百余万人受到牵连 影响 四百二十余万人曾被关押 隔离审查 一百三十余万人曾被公安机关拘留 逮捕 一百七十二万八千余人非正常死亡 十三万五千余人被以现行反革命罪判为死刑 在武斗中有二十三万七千余人死亡 七十三万余人伤残 Chen Yung fa 1998 中國共產革命七十年 下 in Chinese Taipei Linking p 817 文化大革命的非正常死亡人數只有大躍進的十分之一不到 從農民觀點來看 其錯誤之嚴重 遠遠不如大躍進 二千六百萬人慘死 Rummel R J 1991 China s Bloody Century Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 Transaction p 263 ISBN 978 1412814003 Dai Kaiyuan 18 April 2016 文革的本质 场大清洗 The nature of the Cultural Revolution a great purge China News Digest in Chinese Archived from the original on 8 April 2022 Note 12 Agence France Presse Beijing 3February 1979 compiled into FBIS Chi 79 25 5 February 1979 p E2 title missing Meisner Maurice 1986 Mao s China and After A History of the People s Republic 2nd ed Free Press pp 371 372 394 Li s estimate for Guangdong is roughly consistent with a widely accepted nationwide figure of 400 000 Cultural Revolution deaths a number first reported in 1979 by the Agence France Presse correspondent in Peking based on estimates of unofficial but usually reliable Chinese sources The toll may well have been higher It is unlikely that it was less Leightner Jonathan 2017 Ethics Efficiency and Macroeconomics in China From Mao to Xi Taylor amp Francis p 27 ISBN 978 1 351 80583 4 There is no agreement on how many people died during the Cultural Revolution Perhaps one of the best estimates is 400 000 made by a Beijing correspondent for Agence France Presse Meisner 1999 354 Song Yongyi 2002 文革大屠杀 Massacres during the Cultural Revolution Hong Kong Open Magazine ISBN 978 9627934097 Yang Su 2006 文革 中的集体屠杀 三省研究 Collective killings in the Cultural Revolution a study of three provinces Modern China Studies in Chinese 3 Yang Jisheng 2017 天地翻覆 中国文化大革命史 in Chinese Hong Kong Cosmos Books Jian Guo Song Yongyi Zhou Yuan 2015 Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution Rowman amp Littlefield ISBN 978 1 4422 5172 4 Kuhn Anthony 4 February 2014 Chinese Red Guards Apologize Reopening A Dark Chapter NPR Retrieved 14 February 2020 Yu Luowen 文革时期北京大兴县大屠杀调查 An investigation of the Daxing Massacre in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution Chinese University of Hong Kong in Chinese Archived from the original on 4 August 2016 Tan Hecheng 2017 The Killing Wind A Chinese County s Descent Into Madness During the Cultural Revolution Oxford University Press ISBN 978 0 19 062252 7 Jiang Fangzhou 9 November 2012 发生在湖南道县的那场大屠杀 The New York Times in Chinese Retrieved 5 December 2019 Interview People Were Eaten by The Revolutionary Masses Radio Free Asia Retrieved 30 November 2019 Yan Lebin 我参与处理广西文革遗留问题 Yanhuang Chunqiu in Chinese Archived from the original on 24 November 2020 Retrieved 29 November 2019 Chang Jung Halliday Jon 2005 Mao The Unknown Story Knopf ISBN 0679422714 Zhou Yongming 1999 Anti drug Crusades in Twentieth century China Nationalism History and State Building Rowman amp Littlefield ISBN 978 0 8476 9598 0 China s Puzzling Islam Policy Stanford Politics 26 November 2018 Retrieved 27 December 2019 Buckley Chris 4 April 2016 Chaos of Cultural Revolution Echoes at a Lonely Cemetery 50 Years Later The New York Times ISSN 0362 4331 Retrieved 16 February 2020 Phillips Tom 11 May 2016 The Cultural Revolution all you need to know about China s political convulsion The Guardian ISSN 0261 3077 Retrieved 16 February 2020 Ramzy Austin 14 May 2016 China s Cultural Revolution Explained The New York Times ISSN 0362 4331 Retrieved 16 February 2020 Ding Shu 2004 文革中的 清理阶级队伍 运动 三千万人被斗 五十万人死亡 China News Digest in Chinese Archived from the original on 16 August 2017 Retrieved 13 January 2020 Song Yongyi September 2011 文革中 非正常死亡 了多少人 China in Perspective in Chinese Archived from the original on 13 May 2012 Qingxia Dai Yan Dong March 2001 The Historical Evolution of Bilingual Education for China s Ethnic Minorities Chinese Education amp Society 34 2 7 53 doi 10 2753 CED1061 193234027 ISSN 1061 1932 Ethnic languages were repudiated as one of the four olds and large numbers of books and documents pertaining to ethnic languages were burned Wu Jiaping May 2014 The Rise of Ethnicity under China s Market Reforms International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38 3 967 984 doi 10 1111 j 1468 2427 2012 01179 x ISSN 0309 1317 Campaigns of class eradication became more radical during the Cultural Revolution 1966 76 and had a disastrous effect on ethnic culture Ethnic traditions were seen as part of the four olds old ideas customs culture and habits in Chinese sijiu that had to be destroyed Chunli Xia 2007 From Discourse Politics to Rule of Law A Constructivist Framework for Understanding Regional Ethnic Autonomy in China International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 14 4 399 424 doi 10 1163 138548707X247392 ISSN 1385 4879 JSTOR 24675396 Traditional minority designs and colourful lace were marked as four olds sijiu and burnt Fung Edmund S K January 2001 Anti Drug Crusades in Twentieth Century China Nationalism History and State Building Zhou Yongming The China Journal 45 162 ISSN 1324 9347 JSTOR 3182405 Lovell Julia 2019 Maoism A Global History Knopf Doubleday pp 114 115 ISBN 978 0 525 65605 0 Events took a horrific turn in the frontier town of Yanbian where freight trains trundled from China into the DPRK draped with the corpses of Koreans killed in the pitched battles of the Cultural Revolution and daubed with threatening graffiti This will be your fate also you tiny revisionists Khalid Zainab 4 January 2011 Rise of the Veil Islamic Modernity and the Hui Woman PDF SIT Digital Collections Independent Study Project ISP Collection SIT Graduate Institute pp 8 11 Paper 1074 Archived from the original on 9 August 2014 Retrieved 25 July 2014 Powers John Templeman David 2007 Historical Dictionary of Tibet Grove p 35 ISBN 978 0810868052 Adam Jones 2006 Genocide A Comprehensive Introduction Routledge pp 96 97 ISBN 978 0415353854 Ronald D Schwartz 1996 Circle Of Protest Motilal Banarsidass pp 12 13 ISBN

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