![Moral patienthood](https://www.english.nina.az/image-resize/1600/900/web/wikipedia.jpg)
Moral patienthood (also called moral patience,moral patiency, and moral status) is the state of being eligible for moral consideration by a moral agent. In other words, the morality of an action can depend on how it affects or relates to moral patients.
Notions of moral patienthood in non-human animals and artificial entities have been academically explored.
Definition
Most authors define moral patients as "beings that are appropriate objects of direct moral concern". This category may include moral agents, and usually does include them. For instance, Charles Taliaferro says: "A moral agent is someone who can bring about events in ways that are praiseworthy or subject to blame. A moral patient is someone who can be morally mistreated. All moral agents are moral patients, but not all moral patients (human babies, some nonhuman animals) are moral agents."
Narrow usage
Some authors use the term in a more narrow sense, according to which moral patients are "beings who are appropriate objects of direct moral concern but are not (also) moral agents".Tom Regan's The Case for Animal Rights used the term in this narrow sense. This usage was shared by other authors who cited Regan, such as Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu's Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, Dinesh Wadiwel's The War Against Animals, and the Encyclopedia of Population. These authors did not think that moral agents are not eligible for moral consideration, they simply had a different view on how a "moral patient" is defined.
Relationship with moral agency
The paper by Luciano Floridi and J.W. Sanders, On the Morality of Artificial Agents, defines moral agents as "all entities that can in principle qualify as sources of moral action", and defines moral patients, in accordance with the common usage, as "all entities that can in principle qualify as receivers of moral action". However, they note that besides inclusion of agents within patients, other relationships of moral patienthood with moral agency are possible. Marian Quigley's Encyclopedia of Information Ethics and Security summarizes the possibilities that they gave:
How can we characterize the relationship between ethical agents and patients? According to Floridi and Sanders (2004), there are five logical relationships between the class of ethical agents and the class of patients: (1) agents and patients are disjoint, (2) patients can be a proper subset of agents, (3) agents and patients can intersect, (4) agents and patients can be equal, or (5) agents can be a proper subset of patients. Medical ethics, bioethics, and environmental ethics “typify” agents and patients when the patient is specified as any form of life. Animals, for example, can be moral patients but not moral agents. Also, there are ethics that typify moral agenthood to include legal entities (especially human-based entities) such as companies, agencies, and artificial agents, in addition to humans.
Mireille Hildebrandt notes that Floridi and Sanders, in their paper, spoke of "damage" instead of "harm", and that in doing so, they "avoid the usual assumption that an entity must be sentient to count as a patient."
History
In 2021, Open Philanthropy recommended a grant of $315,500 to "support research related to moral patienthood and moral weight."
See also
- Animal rights
- Animal welfare
- Argument from marginal cases
- Artificial sentience
- Ethics of uncertain sentience
- Moral circle expansion
- Precautionary principle
References
- Haji, Ishtiyaque; Bernstein, Mark H. (November 2001). "On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 63 (3): 730. doi:10.2307/3071172. JSTOR 3071172.
- Zhou, Xinyue; Guo, Siyuan; Huang, Rong; Ye, Weiling (2020), Wu, Shuang; Pantoja, Felipe; Krey, Nina (eds.), "Think versus Feel: Two Dimensions of Brand Anthropomorphism: An Abstract", Marketing Opportunities and Challenges in a Changing Global Marketplace, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 351–352, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-39165-2_138, ISBN 978-3-030-39164-5, retrieved 2024-04-16
- Danaher, John (March 2019). "The rise of the robots and the crisis of moral patiency". AI & Society. 34 (1): 129–136. doi:10.1007/s00146-017-0773-9. ISSN 0951-5666.
- Audi, Robert, ed. (2015). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (3 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9781139057509. ISBN 978-1-139-05750-9.
- Jaworska, Agnieszka; Tannenbaum, Julie (2023), "The Grounds of Moral Status", in Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2024-04-16
- Lan T, Sinhababu N, Carrasco LR (2022) Recognition of intrinsic values of sentient beings explains the sense of moral duty towards global nature conservation. PLoS ONE 17(10): e0276614. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0276614
- Müller, N.D. (2022). Kantian Moral Concern, Love, and Respect. In: Kantianism for Animals. The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01930-2_2
- Balle, S.N. Empathic responses and moral status for social robots: an argument in favor of robot patienthood based on K. E. Løgstrup. AI & Soc 37, 535–548 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01211-2
- Harris, J., Anthis, J.R. The Moral Consideration of Artificial Entities: A Literature Review. Sci Eng Ethics 27, 53 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-021-00331-8
- Taliaferro, Charles; Marty, Elsa J., eds. (2018). A dictionary of philosophy of religion (2nd ed.). New York: Bloomsbury Academic, An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Inc. ISBN 978-1-5013-2523-6.
- Bunnin, Nicholas; Yu, Jiyuan (2004). The Blackwell dictionary of Western philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub. ISBN 978-1-4051-0679-5.
- Wadiwel, Dinesh Joseph (2015). The war against animals. Critical animal studies. Leiden; Boston: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-30041-5.
- "Animal Rights | Encyclopedia.com". www.encyclopedia.com. Retrieved 2024-04-16.
- Floridi, Luciano; Sanders, J.W. (August 2004). "On the Morality of Artificial Agents". Minds and Machines. 14 (3): 349–379. doi:10.1023/B:MIND.0000035461.63578.9d. hdl:2299/1822. ISSN 0924-6495.
- Quigley, Marian, ed. (2008). Encyclopedia of information ethics and security. Hershey: Information Science Reference. p. 516. ISBN 978-1-59140-987-8. OCLC 85444168.
- Duff, Antony; Green, Stuart P., eds. (2011). Philosophical foundations of criminal law. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. p. 523. ISBN 978-0-19-955915-2.
- Open Philanthropy (March 2021). "Rethink Priorities — Moral Patienthood and Moral Weight Research". Retrieved December 1, 2023.
Moral patienthood also called moral patience moral patiency and moral status is the state of being eligible for moral consideration by a moral agent In other words the morality of an action can depend on how it affects or relates to moral patients Notions of moral patienthood in non human animals and artificial entities have been academically explored DefinitionMost authors define moral patients as beings that are appropriate objects of direct moral concern This category may include moral agents and usually does include them For instance Charles Taliaferro says A moral agent is someone who can bring about events in ways that are praiseworthy or subject to blame A moral patient is someone who can be morally mistreated All moral agents are moral patients but not all moral patients human babies some nonhuman animals are moral agents Narrow usage Some authors use the term in a more narrow sense according to which moral patients are beings who are appropriate objects of direct moral concern but are not also moral agents Tom Regan s The Case for Animal Rights used the term in this narrow sense This usage was shared by other authors who cited Regan such as Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu s Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy Dinesh Wadiwel s The War Against Animals and the Encyclopedia of Population These authors did not think that moral agents are not eligible for moral consideration they simply had a different view on how a moral patient is defined Relationship with moral agencyThe paper by Luciano Floridi and J W Sanders On the Morality of Artificial Agents defines moral agents as all entities that can in principle qualify as sources of moral action and defines moral patients in accordance with the common usage as all entities that can in principle qualify as receivers of moral action However they note that besides inclusion of agents within patients other relationships of moral patienthood with moral agency are possible Marian Quigley s Encyclopedia of Information Ethics and Security summarizes the possibilities that they gave How can we characterize the relationship between ethical agents and patients According to Floridi and Sanders 2004 there are five logical relationships between the class of ethical agents and the class of patients 1 agents and patients are disjoint 2 patients can be a proper subset of agents 3 agents and patients can intersect 4 agents and patients can be equal or 5 agents can be a proper subset of patients Medical ethics bioethics and environmental ethics typify agents and patients when the patient is specified as any form of life Animals for example can be moral patients but not moral agents Also there are ethics that typify moral agenthood to include legal entities especially human based entities such as companies agencies and artificial agents in addition to humans Mireille Hildebrandt notes that Floridi and Sanders in their paper spoke of damage instead of harm and that in doing so they avoid the usual assumption that an entity must be sentient to count as a patient HistoryIn 2021 Open Philanthropy recommended a grant of 315 500 to support research related to moral patienthood and moral weight See alsoAnimal rights Animal welfare Argument from marginal cases Artificial sentience Ethics of uncertain sentience Moral circle expansion Precautionary principleReferencesHaji Ishtiyaque Bernstein Mark H November 2001 On Moral Considerability An Essay on Who Morally Matters Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 3 730 doi 10 2307 3071172 JSTOR 3071172 Zhou Xinyue Guo Siyuan Huang Rong Ye Weiling 2020 Wu Shuang Pantoja Felipe Krey Nina eds Think versus Feel Two Dimensions of Brand Anthropomorphism An Abstract Marketing Opportunities and Challenges in a Changing Global Marketplace Cham Springer International Publishing pp 351 352 doi 10 1007 978 3 030 39165 2 138 ISBN 978 3 030 39164 5 retrieved 2024 04 16 Danaher John March 2019 The rise of the robots and the crisis of moral patiency AI amp Society 34 1 129 136 doi 10 1007 s00146 017 0773 9 ISSN 0951 5666 Audi Robert ed 2015 The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 3 ed Cambridge Cambridge University Press doi 10 1017 cbo9781139057509 ISBN 978 1 139 05750 9 Jaworska Agnieszka Tannenbaum Julie 2023 The Grounds of Moral Status in Zalta Edward N Nodelman Uri eds The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2023 ed Metaphysics Research Lab Stanford University retrieved 2024 04 16 Lan T Sinhababu N Carrasco LR 2022 Recognition of intrinsic values of sentient beings explains the sense of moral duty towards global nature conservation PLoS ONE 17 10 e0276614 https doi org 10 1371 journal pone 0276614 Muller N D 2022 Kantian Moral Concern Love and Respect In Kantianism for Animals The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series Palgrave Macmillan Cham https doi org 10 1007 978 3 031 01930 2 2 Balle S N Empathic responses and moral status for social robots an argument in favor of robot patienthood based on K E Logstrup AI amp Soc 37 535 548 2022 https doi org 10 1007 s00146 021 01211 2 Harris J Anthis J R The Moral Consideration of Artificial Entities A Literature Review Sci Eng Ethics 27 53 2021 https doi org 10 1007 s11948 021 00331 8 Taliaferro Charles Marty Elsa J eds 2018 A dictionary of philosophy of religion 2nd ed New York Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Inc ISBN 978 1 5013 2523 6 Bunnin Nicholas Yu Jiyuan 2004 The Blackwell dictionary of Western philosophy Malden MA Blackwell Pub ISBN 978 1 4051 0679 5 Wadiwel Dinesh Joseph 2015 The war against animals Critical animal studies Leiden Boston Brill ISBN 978 90 04 30041 5 Animal Rights Encyclopedia com www encyclopedia com Retrieved 2024 04 16 Floridi Luciano Sanders J W August 2004 On the Morality of Artificial Agents Minds and Machines 14 3 349 379 doi 10 1023 B MIND 0000035461 63578 9d hdl 2299 1822 ISSN 0924 6495 Quigley Marian ed 2008 Encyclopedia of information ethics and security Hershey Information Science Reference p 516 ISBN 978 1 59140 987 8 OCLC 85444168 Duff Antony Green Stuart P eds 2011 Philosophical foundations of criminal law Oxford New York Oxford University Press p 523 ISBN 978 0 19 955915 2 Open Philanthropy March 2021 Rethink Priorities Moral Patienthood and Moral Weight Research Retrieved December 1 2023